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1 Introduction to the Dissertation
Climate change is one of the greatest challenges that we face as a global society.
Scientific evidence regarding the human influence on the global climate has accumu-
lated during the last decades. The last report of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC 2014, p. 47) summarizes that it is “extremely likely” that the
dominant cause of the observed global average surface temperature since the mid-20th
century is the anthropogenic increase in greenhouse gas concentrations.
Since about the same time an increasing number of economists have been thinking
about the climate change problem. At least since the publication of the Stern Review
in 2006 that called climate change the “greatest market failure the world has ever
seen” (Stern 2007, p. viii), the global community acknowledged that research on the
economic characteristics of the climate problem is of prime importance. The simple
reason is that the human influence on climate change through greenhouse gas emissions
is still strongly linked to economic growth that is fueled by the combustion of fossil
fuels which yet provide the lion’s share of the global energy supply.
In the recent paper The Economics of the Climate that was published in the Journal
of Economic Literature, Heal (2017) reviews central aspects of the climate change
problem that we as economists need to deal with. Those aspects include the discussion
of an appropriate rate to discount future benefits of climate change mitigation, the
effect of climate change on notions of sustainability as well as issues of uncertainty and
geoengineering. With the first two chapters of my dissertation I seek to contribute
to the first two aspects mentioned in Heal’s overview (Discounting and Sustainability
and Substitution).
Climate change occurs on a very long timescale. Hence, while the costs of climate
change mitigation have to be born by the current generation, the benefits are mostly
felt in the more distant future. As a consequence the cost-benefit ratio of climate
change mitigation policies is highly sensitive to the rate at which those future ben-
efits are discounted. Moreover, deciding on an appropriated discount rate translates
into distinct assumptions about how well-being shall be intertemporally distributed.
During the last decades there has been a controversial debate on the appropriate dis-
count rate (Nordhaus 2007, 2008; Stern 2007) leading to very different estimations
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of the social cost of carbon, i.e. the societal cost of emitting an extra ton of carbon
dioxide (CO2) into the atmosphere. The social cost of carbon is an important figure
that is widely used by governmental bodies to inform carbon pricing (e.g. by the US
Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon (IWG 2016).
In the co-authored first chapter of my dissertation (with Martin F. Quaas), entitled
Intertemporal Distribution, Sufficiency, and the Social Cost of Carbon, we suggest to
avoid explicit discounting choices but instead directly specify alternative intertemporal
distributions of well being. The advantage of our approach is that it becomes very
clear that the social cost of carbon is largely determined by normative conceptions
of intergenerational distributive justice. Specifically we use the well-known Dynamic
Integrated Climate Economy model (DICE) to find that the social cost of carbon
increases over-proportional with the level of well-being that is reached when the global
economy is in steady state. We call this constant steady state “sufficiency” level of
well-being as it reflects the desire for long-run growth of the global economy. We
propose that a controversial discussion on what might be a sufficient level of well
being could be more transparent than deciding on an abstract rate with which to
discount future well-being in the light of climate change.
I have contributed substantially to this paper at every stage of the research process,
including the design of the research question, analytical and numerical modeling as well
as writing and revising the paper. The paper has been published online in Ecological
Economics (https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2017.11.024).
The debate on an appropriate discount rate to value future cost and benefits that
was initiated by the Stern Review quickly also led to extensions of the standard dis-
counting framework. Among others, considering changing relative prices of goods and
services that are not traded on markets, like environmental goods that become suc-
cessively scarcer due to climate change, has received attention (Gollier 2010, Hoel
and Sterner 2007, Sterner and Persson 2008). Also Heal (2017) explicitly mentions
changing relative prices of natural capital in his chapter on sustainability and sub-
stituition as an important issue to be dealt with in climate economics. The reason
is that if non-market goods and services, like those provided by the natural environ-
ment, are important for economic welfare and climate change irreversibly damages
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their available stock, than economic welfare can only be sustainable if the substitution
possibilities between market-traded human made goods and non-market environmen-
tal goods is high enough. Until now, there exists no systematic study of how relative
prices of non-market goods change in the presence of climate change. The purpose of
the second co-authored chapter of my dissertation (with Moritz A. Drupp), entitled
Relative Prices and Climate Policy: How the Scarcity of Non-Market Goods Drives
Policy Evaluation, is to fill this gap.
It provides a comprehensive analysis of the change in the relative price of non-
market goods in terms of market goods, its determinants and its impact on climate
policy evaluation. We consider non-market goods and services at a highly aggregated
level including those related to human health and to the natural environment that can
range from clean water to aesthetic beauty. After the introduction of relative prices
of non-market goods in a stylized model, we make use of the latest version of the
integrated assessment model DICE to first replicate the results of an earlier study on
changing relative prices (Sterner and Persson 2008) and subsequently numerically il-
lustrate how relative price changes should be interpreted. Here we show that the DICE
model already implicitly contains changing relative prices, which can be described by
a mild degree of complementarity of market and non-market goods.
Based on an extensive sensitivity analysis of the determinants of relative price
changes as well as recent empirical evidence, we provide a plausible range and a central
estimation for the change in the relative price and three climate policy measures until
the end of this century. For our central calibration we find that neglecting relative
price changes would lead to a considerable underestimation of the social cost of carbon
of almost 50 percent for the current generation. Additionally we make a connection to
the discounting debate and show that, when using the peak atmospheric temperature
as a comparison metric, considering changing relative prices is equivalent to adjusting
the rate of pure time preference by more than a half percentage point. Hence, we
conclude that the changing relative price of non-market goods in terms of market
goods is of considerable magnitude compared to established determinants of economic
evaluation.
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The paper has been presented at multiple international conferences and workshops
and we are considering the submission to a general economic journal. I have con-
tributed substantially to this paper at every stage of the research process, including
the design of the research question, analytical and numerical modeling as well as writ-
ing and revising the paper.
An overarching topic in Heal’s review is uncertainty with respect to the damage
function of integrated assessment models. It maps changing atmospheric temperatures
into economic losses and is thus, essential in bridging the dynamics of the climate with
those of the economic system in order to quantify climate damage. However, the rise
in atmospheric CO2 does not only lead to increasing temperatures on the earth’s
surface, but also generates the other CO2 problem that is not explicitly considered
in damage functions. A considerable amount of atmospheric CO2 is taken up by
the oceans and although this CO2 sink buffers the temperature increase on earth, it
makes the ocean become more acidic. This phenomenon, termed as ocean acidification,
is projected to negatively affect ecosystem services provided by the oceans, such as,
among others, fisheries, biodiversity and tourism (Turley and Gattuso 2012, Hilmi et
al. 2012, Gattuso et al. 2015, Rodrigues et al. 2015). Socioeconomic consequences
could be considerable especially for small developing island nations that mostly depend
on income generated from sectors that could be affected (Cooley et al. 2012). Thus,
even if the impact of ocean acidification on the global damage function was negligible,
because developed economies have enough sectors that are independent from damage
of ocean acidification, it is important to develop policies that address the damage from
ocean acidification in developing economies.
In the third chapter of my dissertation, entitled Interacting Externalites of Ocean
Acidification, Global Warming and Eutrophication: General Equilibrium Analysis for
a Developing Country, I change the focus from a global to a national analysis of the
economically optimal mitigation of climate change. I describe a developing economy
that depends on agriculture and fisheries to study optimal and second-best environ-
mental policy in the face of interacting external effects of ocean acidification, global
warming and eutrophication. Hence, I account for the recommendation given in recent
ocean acidification research to study ocean acidification in a broader context of global
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environmental change (Riebesell and Gattuso 2015). In particular on a regional basis,
ocean acidification is often intensified by eutrophication casued by nutrient run-off
from acidic fertilizers used in agricultural production.
The proposed general equilibrium model is designed to capture stylized facts of
ocean acidification research in order to study optimal policy responses when exter-
nalities interact. I not only derive an analytic expression for the optimal tax on
atmospheric carbon and nutrient run-off, but also for the second-best optimal tax on
nutrient run-off for the case that the negative effects of global warming and ocean acid-
ification are not fully internalized by the carbon tax. I show that the second-best tax
on nutrient run-off will always be higher than its Pigouvian level, which is equal to the
marginal social damage of nutrient run-off, to account for those damages not covered
by the carbon tax. The last chapter of my dissertation reveals that although climate
change is a global phenomenon and only a global solution can tackle it entirely, it can
be vital to design national policy instruments that capture regional distinctiveness of
environmental change under increasing CO2 levels.
This last chapter is single-authored and has been presented at the 2017 World
Congress of the Resource Modeling Association in Barcelona. I consider submitting it
to a field journal in environmental and resource economics.
5
References
Gattuso, J.-P., Magnan, A., Bille´, R., Cheung, W. W. L., Howes, E. L., Joos, F.,
Allemand, D., Bopp, L., Cooley, S. R., Eakin, C. M., Hoegh-Guldberg, O., Kelly, R.
P., Po¨rtner, H.-O., Rogers, A. D., Baxter, J. M., Laffoley, D., Osborn, D., Rankovic,
A., Rochette, J., Sumaila, U. R., Treyer, S. and C. Turley. (2013), Contrasting
futures for ocean and society from different anthropogenic CO2 emissions scenarios,
Science 349(6243): 45–57.
Gollier, C. (2010), Ecological discounting, Journal of Economic Theory 145: 812–829.
Heal, G. (2017), The Economics of the Climate, Journal of Economic Literature
55(3): 1046-–1063
Allemand, D., Dupont, S., Safa, A., Haraldsson, G., Nunes, P.A.L.D., Moore, C., Hat-
tam, C., Reynaud, S., Hall-Spencer, J.M., Turley, C., Jeffree, R., Orr, J.,Munday,
P.L., and S.R. Cooley (2012), Towards improved socio-economic assessments of
ocean acidification’s impacts, Marine Biology 160(6): 1773–1778.
Hoel, M., and T. Sterner (2007), Discounting and relative prices, Climatic Change
84: 265–280.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2014). Climate Change 2014: Syn-
thesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assess-
ment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/syr.
Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases (2016). Technical
Update of the Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis, United States
Government.
Nordhaus, W.D. (2007), The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change,
Journal of Economic Literature 45(3): 686–702.
Nordhaus, W. (2008), A Question of Balance: Economic Modeling of Global Warm-
ing, Yale University Press, New Haven, USA. The DICE model is obtainable from:
www.nordhaus.econ.yale.edu/DICE2007.htm
6
Riebesell, U. and Gattuso, J.-P. (2015), Lessons learned from ocean acidification
research, Nature Climate Change 5: 12–14.
Bergh, Jeroen C. J. M., Loureiro, M.L., Nunes, P.A.L.D. and Sergio Rossi (2015),
The Cost of Mediterranean Sea Warming and Acidification: A Choice Experiment
Among Scuba Divers at Medes Islands, Spain, Environmental and Resource Eco-
nomics 63(2): 289–311.
Stern, N. (2007). Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change. Government
Economics Service.
Sterner, T., and M. Persson (2008), An even Sterner review: Introducing relative
prices into the discounting debate, Review of Environmental Economics and Policy
2(1): 61–76.
Turley, C., and J-P. Gattuso (2012), Future biological and ecosystem impacts of
ocean acidification and their socioeconomic-policy implications, Current Opinion
in Environmental Sustainability 4(3): 278–286.
7

2 Intertemporal Distribution, Sufficiency, and the
Social Cost of Carbon
This chapter has been published as:
Ha¨nsel, M.C. and M.F. Quaas (2018). Intertemporal Distribution, Sufficiency, and
the Social Cost of Carbon.
Ecological Economics 146: 520–535.∗
Abstract: We explore how the intertemporal distribution of well-being affects the so-
cial cost of carbon. In contrast to the literature that studies parameters of a particular
social welfare function, such as the discount rate, we shift the focus and directly as-
sume a parametric form for the intertemporal distribution of well-being. This has the
advantage of avoiding explicit discounting choices, which has initiated much debate.
Specifically, we consider a set of intertemporal distributions that reach a pre-specified
steady-state level of “sufficient” well-being, or equivalently, after a pre-specified “end-
of-growth horizon”. We numerically illustrate our results in DICE and find that the
social cost of carbon increases over-proportionally with the sufficiency level of well-
being. While the social cost of carbon in 2015 is US$ 7 if the sufficiency level is
four-fold the present level, it is US$ 30 if the sufficiency level is 15-fold and US$ 100 if
the sufficiency level is 26-fold the present level. This shows in a transparent way how
conceptions of intergenerational distributive justice drive the social cost of carbon.
Keywords: Climate change, social cost of carbon, optimal tax, DICE, optimal
growth, sustainability, social welfare function, discounting
∗Acknowledgments: We are grateful to three anonymous reviewers, Jeroen van den Bergh, Vincent
Martinet, Linda Kleemann and Moritz Drupp for fruitful suggestions. Also we thank participants of
ULVO¨N 2014, EAERE 2015 and RMA 2015 conferences as well as the ECCUITY workshop 2014 for
valuable comments. We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the German Federal Ministry
of Education and Research under grant 03F0655J and 01LA1104A-C.
2.1 Introduction
A major challenge for humankind is avoiding dangerous climate change. Economic
studies of optimal climate policy typically use integrated assessment models (IAMs) to
determine an optimal path of emission abatement (Stern 2007, Nordhaus 2008, Golosov
et al. 2014). Many of these studies adopt an intertemporal discounted utilitarian social
welfare function (SWF) and arrive at remarkably different estimates for the optimal tax
rate on carbon emissions into the atmosphere, i.e. the social cost of carbon (Table 3.1).
These differences are largely attributable to the specific parametrization of the SWF in
terms of the so called “ethical parameters”, namely the social time preference rate (ρ)
and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (1/η). The specification of parameter
values for ρ and η translates into specific assumptions about how well-being2 ought to
be intertemporally distributed.
Table 2.1: Selected estimates of the optimal carbon tax, quoted after Golosov et al. (2014)
Study Parameter Optimal tax
Nordhaus (2008) ρ = 1.5%, η = 2 30 US$/tC
Golosov et al. (2014) ρ = 1.5%, η = 1 60 US$/tC
Stern (2007) ρ = 0.1%, η = 1 250 US$/tC
Starting with Ramsey (1928), the long lasting economic and philosophical discus-
sion on which intertemporal SWF should be applied mostly focuses on the “correct”
parametrization of the SWF within the standard discounted utilitarian framework
(Buchholz and Schymura 2011). Recently there is a growing literature developing al-
ternative social welfare criteria (Asheim 2010, Zuber and Asheim 2012, Fleurbaey and
Zuber 2015) although applications of these in well-known IAMs are still relatively rare
(Botzen and van den Bergh 2014).
Instead of studying a particular SWF and restricting the analysis to specific ethical
2In the studies presented in table 3.1 the level of well-being reduces to an index of consumption
equivalents (or inclusive consumption), which abstracts from the relative price effects of other com-
ponents of well-being on the social cost of carbon, like environmental quality (Sterner and Persson
2008). We acknowledge this shortcoming, but stick to using inclusive consumption as a proxy for
well-being as defined in Nordhaus and Sztorc (2013) and Nordhaus (2014) for our analysis.
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parameter values, one can also take a very different approach, which avoids explicit dis-
counting choices: the intertemporal distribution of well-being can directly be specified
in a parametric form. Recently this direct approach has been applied to study sus-
tainable economic development in the light of anthopogenic climate change (Llavador
et al. 2010, 2011, Roemer 2011). However, these studies do not systematically address
the question how the intertemporal distribution of well-being is related to the social
cost of carbon.
In this paper we parametrize intertemporal paths of well-being that allow us to
study the trade-off between the intertemporal distribution of human-well being and
the present social cost of carbon. We choose a specific set of intertemporal distribu-
tions that is driven by five underlying assumptions, which mainly reflect a schedule
of smoothly decreasing growth rates leading to a steady state with a pre-specified
constant, “sufficient” level of well-being, or, equivalently, after a pre-specified “end-of-
growth” horizon, resulting in an “s-shaped” intertemporal distribution of well-being.
Due to, among others, the last global economic crisis, climate change and biodiversity
loss, the debate on limits to economic growth pioneered by Meadows et al. (1972) has
recently been intensified (Turner 2008, Victor 2010, Antal and van den Bergh 2014).
In a recent questionnaire on public opinions on economic growth and environmental
sustainability Drews and van den Bergh (2016) find that two thirds of the respondents
believe that growth in rich countries will stop at some future point in time. This is
consistent with developing countries typically following an s-shaped course of economic
development with high initial growth rates, which decrease in the course of time. Also
the DICE model assumes that the growth rate will continuously decline down to zero.
Among the s-shaped set of development paths, we determine the one that mini-
mizes the time until the pre-specified sufficient level of well-being is reached (i.e., the
“end-of-growth horizon”). By varying the sufficiency level of well-being we can study
how the desire for economic efficiency, growth and the resulting intertemporal distri-
bution affects the social cost of carbon. We quantitatively illustrate our results with
the 2013 version of DICE (Nordhaus and Sztorc 2013, Nordhaus 2014), which is the
most widespread and well-known IAM. The minimization of the end-of-growth hori-
zon requires a full-fledged dynamic optimization, as it affects patterns of investment in
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human-made capital, as well as carbon emissions into the atmosphere, both of which
have long-term consequences that fully have to be taken into account.
We believe that our approach to directly define intertemporal distributions of well-
being has clear advantages over making specific discounting choices. For society and
policy-makers it might be easier to agree on a certain intertemporal distribution of
well-being than to argue on parameter values for a particular SWF. In a recent sur-
vey, Drupp et al. (2015) elicit expert opinion on the value of the long-term social
discount rate. One of the responses to their open-ended question for comments was
the following: ”Instead of imposing a SWF and calculate the corresponding optimum,
it is ‘better’ to depict a set of feasible paths of consumption, production, temperature,
income distribution, etc. and let the policy maker make a choice” (Drupp et al. 2015,
p.17). A similar metaphor has been proposed by Edenhofer and Minx (2014) who
suggest economists to construct a feasible “map” of economic development that could
be used by policy-makers to “navigate” among different policy options.
Such a “map” requires to parameterize a conceivable set of feasible paths of well-
being. As discussed above, the set of s-shaped paths of intertemporal well-being is a
particular sensible assumption. This is why we focus on this particular specification
in this paper. For each efficient path the policy-maker will be able to obtain the as-
sociated social cost of carbon under optimal climate policy. For society our approach
could lead to a better informed discussion on normative conceptions of intergener-
ational distributive justice, which crucially determine the social cost of carbon and
are typically hidden in discounting choices within the standard discounted utilitarian
model. It becomes very clear, for example, that the desire to attain a high level of
well-being in the future, or equivalently to keep the global economy growing for a
longer time horizon, substantially increases the social costs of carbon, because in the
long-run growth of well-being requires to protect the future generations from adverse
consequences of climate change.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 first formally
derives the condition prescribing the optimal intertemporal distribution of well-being
when using a (discounted) utilitarian SWF, which is embodied in most IAMs like
DICE. Second, we briefly sketch the relevant literature that uses this condition to
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capture social preferences with respect to intertemporal distributions in IAMs. Section
2.3 characterizes our approach of directly considering a specific functional form for the
intertemporal distribution of well-being. Section 2.4 presents the numerical results of
the dynamic optimization, before section 2.5 discusses our results.
2.2 Intertemporal distributional objectives embodied in a so-
cial welfare function
The dominant approach to determine the social costs of carbon is to use a Social Wel-
fare Function in a dynamic Integrated Assessment Model of climate and the economy
(IAMs), such as DICE (Nordhaus 2014). In order to contrast our approach of direcly
specifying the intertemporal distribution of well-being with a functional form to this
standard in the literature, we briefly describe the Social Welfare approach.
Most deterministic dynamic IAMs rank intertemporal paths of per capita con-
sumption ct, which they refer to as inclusive consumption capturing “well-being”, by
means of the intertemporal social welfare function (SWF),
W0(c0, c1, c2, . . . ) =
T∑
t=0
1
(1 + ρ)t
Lt
c1−ηt
1− η , (2.1)
which can be interpreted as the discounted Utilitarian objective function or as the util-
ity function of a representative, infinitely-lived agent (ILA), weighted by population
size Lt. We consider a discrete-time setting with t = 0, 1, 2, . . . T . The parameters of
the welfare function are the time preference rate, ρ, and the preference for consump-
tion smoothing over time, η, with 1/η being the constant intertemporal elasticity of
substitution of consumption.
Maximizing (3.6) subject to the economic and climate constraints of the DICE
model (Nordhaus 2014) leads to the following condition (see Appendix 1 for a deriva-
tion),
(1 + ρ)
(
1 +
ct − ct−1
ct−1
)η
= 1 + YKt − δK , (2.2)
where YKt denotes the marginal productivity of capital and δ
K the proportional rate
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of capital depreciation. Equation (2.2) is the discrete-time version of the well-known
Ramsey rule (Dasgupta 2008) and characterizes the intertemporal distribution of well-
being that is optimal according to (3.6).
Much of the recent economic debate on the social costs of carbon focuses on how a
society should choose the values for the discounting parameters of a SWF, i.e. ρ and
η. Interpreting the SWF (3.6) as the utility function of a representative ILA, these
parameters can be derived from observed behavior on markets reflecting opportunity
costs of capital (Arrow et al. 1996, Buchholz and Schymura 2011). In this vein, Nord-
haus (2008) argues that short-term time preferences should be in line with historical
consumption choices. He thus uses the Ramsey equation (2.2) to determine ρ and η
from inferred values of real market interest rates and the consumption growth rate.
Other studies interpret the intertemporal SWF (3.6) as the (discounted) Utilitarian
objective. According to this point of view, ethical considerations regarding intergen-
erational trade-offs of well-being should guide the choice of ρ and η (Arrow et al. 1996,
Aldy et al. 2010), often implying a more long-term focus on climate impacts (Stern
2007, Gerlagh and Liski 2017). Already Ramsey (1928) and Pigou (1932) argued for
a zero rate of time preference on ethical grounds. In this approach, the rate at which
future well-being is discounted falls considerably below the opportunity cost of capital
and thus these studies arrive at much higher estimates for the social cost of carbon.
In that vein, (Stern 2007) uses a very small value of ρ = 0.001, merely to reflect a
positive probability that humankind may become extinct at some future date, and
calculates an optimal carbon tax, which exceeds the one recommended by Nordhaus
(2008) by almost one order of magnitude.
In addition, an increasing number of studies consider declining discount rates, e.g.
due to uncertainty about future discount rates (Arrow et al. 2013, 2014, Cropper et al.
2014), or when aggregating heterogeneous individual discount rates (Heal and Millner
2013, Quaas et al. 2017). There are also several studies that consider Epstein-Zin
(Epstein and Zin 1989) preferences to disentangle risk aversion and time preference
in order to more appropriately capture observed preferences over the distribution of
income over time (Ackerman et al. 2013). Finally, some studies use surveys to elicit
expert opinion on the discounting parameters of a SWF (Weitzman 2001, Drupp et al.
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2015, Howard and Sylvan 2015). The most recent expert survey from Drupp et al.
(2015) finds that only a minority of experts recommends discounting parameters in
line with the Ramsey equation (2.2).
The diversity in views on the correct values for the discounting parameters ρ and η
is one of the main drivers in explaining the broad range of estimates for the social cost
of carbon today. Many studies, however, do not make explicit which distributional
assumptions are embodied in their choice of ρ and η. Indeed, small differences in
the specification of ρ and η may lead to substantially different values for the social
cost of carbon (van den Bijgaart et al. 2016). We believe that most policy-makers,
and probably even many scholars, will have difficulties in making up their opinion
on the correct values for these parameters accurately enough that they can trust the
resulting value for the social cost of carbon. Possibly policy-makers will not be able to
recognize what actually drives a certain estimate for the social cost of carbon, which
may damage the applicability of such a quantitative estimate.
We thus propose to shift the focus away from discounting choices of a particular
SWF, but instead directly assume a functional form for the intertemporal distribution
of well-being. This enables us to simulate a set of intertemporal distributions and
quantitatively estimate each resulting social cost of carbon by using the DICE model.
In the next section 2.3 we explicitly introduce the suggested functional form for the
intertemporal distribution of well-being.
2.3 A direct specification of the intertemporal distribution
The main aspects in our specification of the intertemporal distribution of well-being
are that (a) the present level of well-being, c0, is kept fixed, and (b) that some steady-
state level of well-being, cmax, is obtained after a finite time of growth, i.e. after the
“end-of-growth horizon”, τ . This means, we impose the following assumptions.
Assumption 1 (Given level of initial well-being). The current generation’s well-being
is kept fixed at the observed level c0.
Assumption 2 (end-of-growth horizon/sufficiency). Growth in well-being is main-
tained until τ > 0 such that after finite time τ a steady-state with constant well-being
cmax > c0 is reached.
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In addition, we have to specify the development of well-being between the present,
t = 0, and τ > 0. To this end, we define the notions of a preference for “early growth”
and a preference for “smooth growth”, which we capture by ‘preference’ functions h(·)
and f(·), respectively. Both apply to the period of growth only, as after τ the economy
then is in a steady state by definition, such that notions of “early growth” or “smooth
growth” are meaningless after τ .
In a sense, the notions of “early growth” and “smooth growth” capture the ideas
of discounting and a preference for intertemporal consumption smoothing. The func-
tional forms of h(·) and f(·) will then specify the preference for “early growth” and
“smooth growth”. The difference between the setting considered here and the stan-
dard discounted utilitarian setting is that here we define the two separately, rather
than having both aspects of intertemporal preferences built into one social welfare
function.
Definition 1 (early growth). If there are two feasible streams ct and c
′
t with the same
aggregate level of well-being over [0, T ],
∫ T
0
(ct − c′t) dt = 0, ct is said to exhibit ‘early
growth’ relative to c′t if ∫ τ
0
h(t− τ) ct dt >
∫ τ
0
h(t− τ) c′t dt, (2.3)
with h′(t − τ) < 0 (and without loss of generality h(0) = 0) capturing preference for
early growth.
The function h(·) that is declining over time, similarly to a discount factor, gives
a higher weight to well-being at early points in time compared to later points in time.
The more strongly h(·) declines over time, the ‘stronger’ is the preference for early
growth.3
The second assumption is that society tends to prefer “smooth growth”, i.e. a
consumption path that avoids strong fluctuations, defined as follows:
3Below we specify the preference for early growth by a quadratic function h(t− τ) = (τ − t)2.
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Definition 2 (smooth growth). If there are two feasible streams ct and c
′
t with the
same aggregate level of well-being over [0, T ],
∫ T
0
(ct − c′t) dt = 0, ct is said to have
‘smooth growth’ relative to c′t if∫ τ
0
f(ct) dt >
∫ τ
0
f(c′t) dt, (2.4)
with f ′′(c) < 0 capturing preference for smooth growth.
The curvature properties of the concave function f(·) capture the preference for
smoothing out consumption over time. The more concave the function f(·) is, the
stronger is the preference for smooth growth.4 Based on these two definitions, we now
state the assumptions on social preferences.
Assumption 3 (early growth). Consider two feasible streams ct and c
′
t with the same
aggregate level of well-being over [0, T ], and same ‘smoothness’,
∫ T
0
(f(ct)− f(c′t)) dt =
0. If ct exhibits ‘early growth’ relative to c
′
t, ct is preferred over c
′
t, ct  c′t.
Assumption 4 (smooth growth). Consider two feasible streams ct and c
′
t with the
same aggregate consumption over [0, T ], and same ‘earliness’,
∫ τ
0
h(t−τ) (ct − c′t) dt =
0. If ct exhibits ‘smooth growth’ relative to c
′
t, ct is preferred over c
′
t, ct  c′t.
To illustrate how these assumptions work, consider the function
ct =
 c
1−(1− tθ )
2
max · c(1−
t
θ )
2
0 for t ≤ θ
cmax for t > θ
, (2.5)
for ct, which has the three parameters c0, cmax and θ (we will discuss this function
in further detail below). If both ct and c
′
t have such a functional form, in Assump-
tion 3 two of the parameters are constrained by the conditions on identical aggregate
well-being and identical ‘smoothness’, while the differences in the third one can give
rise to differences in ‘earliness’. Similarly, in Assumption 4 two of the parameters are
constrained by the conditions on identical aggregate well-being and identical ‘earli-
ness’, while the differences in the third one can give rise to differences in ‘smoothness’.
4Below we specify the preference for smooth growth by the Shannon entropy measure, i.e. we
specify f(c) = −c ln(c).
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This is illustrated in Figure 2.1, panels (a) and (b), where we use f(c) = −c ln(c) to
characterize the preference for smoothness and h(t− τ) = (τ − t)2 to characterize the
preference for earliness (see footnotes 3 and 4). In panel (a), the two paths ct and c
′
t
have the same aggregate well-being (4914), and the same ‘smoothness’ (-6199), but
the path ct exhibits more early growth compared to c
′
t (15.3 vs. 11.0 millions). In panel
(b), the two paths ct and c
′
t have the same aggregate well-being (4914), and the same
‘earliness’ (15.3 millions), but the path ct exhibits more smooth growth compared to
c′t (-6199 vs. -6584).
We will see below that when the function h(·) capturing the preference for early
growth and the function f(·) capturing the preference for smooth growth are specified,
and given assumptions 1 and 2, the intertemporal distribution of well-being is specified
except for the values of τ and cmax. These are fixed by imposing the following standard
efficiency condition.
Assumption 5 (efficiency). Consider two feasible streams ct and c
′
t with the same
‘smoothness’,
∫ τ
0
(f(ct)− f(c′t)) dt = 0, and the same ‘earliness’,
∫ τ
0
h(t−τ) (ct − c′t) dt =
0. If ct exhibits a higher aggregate level of well-being than c
′
t,
∫ T
0
(ct − c′t) dt > 0, ct is
preferred over c′t, ct  c′t.
Given the above-made assumptions, the consumption path is characterized by the
following theorem.
Theorem 1. Under Assumptions 1–5, and for a pre-specified end-of-growth horizon
τ , well-being ct is monotonic in time from c0 to cτ = cmax according to
ct = f
′−1
(
f ′(cmax)
(
1 +
h(t− τ)
h(−τ)
(
f ′(c0)
f ′(cmax)
− 1
)))
(2.6)
with
cmax = max {cmax ∈ X| ct given by (2.6) for all t < τ and ct = cmax for all t ≥ τ} .
(2.7)
where X is the set of consumption paths that is feasible given the economic and climate
constraints.
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cmax
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c0
Figure 2.1: Panels (a) and (b) illustrate Assumptions 3 and 4. In panel (a), the two paths ct and
c′t have the same aggregate well-being per capita and the same smoothness, but ct exhibits more
early growth compared to c′t. In panel (b), the two paths ct and c
′
t have the same aggregate well-
being and the same earliness, but ct exhibits more smooth growth compared to c
′
t. Panels (c) and
(d) show well-being per capita ct for varying end-of-growth horizon (panel c) and varying maximum
well-being per capita (panel d). In both panels, the shift from the lower to the upper curve illustrates
optimization towards the Pareto-efficient path of well-being. All paths are constructed with the
functional form (2.5), parameter specifications are given in the figures.
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The proof of theorem 1 can be found in Appendix 2. Smoothness and monotonic
growth follow directly from assumptions 3 and 4. For a given end-of-growth-horizon
τ , assumptions 1–4 specify the intertemporal distribution of well-being only up to
the free parameter cmax. Efficiency requires that this level is chosen at the maximum
feasible level, as stated in (2.7).
The higher the sufficiency level of steady-state well-being or the more we shift τ into
the future, the more evenly growth in well-being will be intertemporally distributed
and thus, the more weight society puts on intergenerational distributive justice. Thus,
changing cmax or shifting τ back and fourth in time enables us to study a set of
intertemporal distributions, which can incorporate different conceptions of intergen-
erational distributive justice. If τ is equal to zero, the result would be the maximin
distribution (Solow 1974), i.e. an intertemporally constant well-being per capita level,
which equals the level of the first, worst-off generation. By construction, however,
maximin dismisses any investment into the well-being of future generations above the
level of the present generation. Consequently, a strict application hinders economic
growth leading to stagnation (Rawls 1971). Rawls (1971) proposed a two-stage model
in order to assure distributive justice between generations. During a first accumulation
phase generations would be required to adopt a positive net savings rate determined
by a just savings principle resulting in positive growth rates of well-being. Once equal
liberties and just institutions are implemented the net savings rate would fall to zero
in the beginning of the second stage leading to a zero steady-state growth rate of well-
being. Thus, Rawls’ idea is that economic growth is not desirable per se, but rather
because it brings about just institutions and equal liberties. Once these are estab-
lished generations should leave as least as much as they received from the generation
before. In terms of our model, the first phase takes until τ , while the second phase
corresponds to a steady state at the sufficiency level of well-being cmax.
Some growth in human well-being may be desirable for different reasons. For ex-
ample parents may wish their children to have a higher quality of live compared to
them or society wants to make an on-going development of humankind’s achievements,
like increasing average life expectancy, also possible in the far future (Llavador et al.
2011). In a series of recent papers Llavador, Roemer, and Silvestre (2010, 2011) and
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Roemer (2011) study the implications of alternative distributions of intergenerational
well-being on the first generations’ well-being in a dynamic framework with an exoge-
nous emissions scenario. By maximizing the initial level of well-being and maintaining
a constant exogenous growth rate of well-being afterwards, they show that both inter-
generational maximin (i.e. no growth) and a sustainable growth path are feasible and
yield higher levels of well-being for the first generation than their reference value in
2000. Moreover, they find that in case of the sustainable growth path, the trade-off
for the first generation in terms of consumption sacrifice is small compared to the
prospect of sustained future growth in well-being.
We reflect these considerations by requiring efficiency, which means to maximize
consumption subject to the technical and natural constraints. Here we consider these
constraints as specified in the DICE model (Nordhaus 2014). Appendices 1 and 3
describe the details of the DICE model including functional forms.
The maximization problem in equation (2.7) states that the Pareto efficient path
is obtained by choosing the path of well-being per capita and CO2 emissions in a way
that results in the maximal steady state level of well-being per capita for a particular
end-of growth horizon. Straightforward calculations show that ct, as given by (2.6)
is monotonically increasing with cmax and monotonically decreasing with τ . Thus,
efficiency can be equivalently obtainted by maximizing cmax for a given end-of-growth
horizon τ , or by minimizing τ for a given sufficiency level of well-being cmax. In the
following, we focus on the latter approach, and vary the pre-specified steady-state level
of well-being per capita that could be interpreted as “sufficient” in the sense of Rawls
(1971). We are particularly interested in the question how changes in cmax affect the
social cost of carbon (see section 2.4).
The exact functional forms of h(·) and f(·) determine the shape of the function that
gives well-being as a function of time in the growth period 0 < t < τ . In order to apply
our approach, we have to give the problem more structure and to specify the functional
forms for h(·) and f(·). In the following corollary to Theorem 1 we propose specific
functional forms that lead to a growth function that we find particularly appealing.
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Corollary 1. Under Assumptions 1–5, and with the specification f(c) = −c ln(c) and
h(t− τ) = (t− τ)2, the intertemporal distribution of well-being is given by (2.5) with
θ = τ and the objective is to choose, for given values of c0 and τ , the maximal feasible
cmax given the economic and climate constraints.
The results follows after few steps of calculations when using the functional forms
for h(·) and f(·) in (2.6). Corollary 1 specifies a particular preference for early growth,
as captured by the particular specification of the function h(t− τ) = (t− τ)2, i.e. the
squared difference of the present point in time from the end-of-growth horizon τ . It
also specifies a particular preference for smooth growth, as captured by the particular
specification of the function f(·) = −c ln(c), which is the Shannon entropy of the
consumption path – a “smoothness” measure commonly used in various applications.
As a result, we obtain the functional form for the intertemporal distribution of
well-being results given in (2.5). At any point in time, well-being ct is a weighted
geometric average of initial well-being and the sufficient steady-state level of well-
being cmax, where the weight on cmax increases over time, for t < τ , according to
(1− t/τ)2. If cmax is large compared to c0, a sigmoid time path of well-being results.
Using gc to denote the initial growth rate of ct, gc ≡ c˙0/c0, the functional form (2.5)
can also be written as ct = cmax exp
(− g0
2 τ
(t− τ)2) for all t < τ . For the growth rate
of well-being we obtain
c˙t
ct
= max {gc (1− t/τ) , 0} . (2.8)
Thus, we have growth, c˙t > 0, for all t < τ and ct = cmax thereafter. The growth rate is
linearly decreasing from gc to zero within the time horizon τ , and remains zero after τ .
This reflects the stylized fact that during the course of economic development growth
rates are typically relatively high first and decline thereafter. The linear decrease is a
particular simple description of this process.5
Panels (c) and (d) in Figure 2.1 illustrate the optimization problems to maximize
cmax for a given value of τ or to minimize τ for a given value of cmax. Both problems
are equivalent.
5If the growth rate of well-being does not linearly decrease, the dynamics of well-being per capita
and the resulting social cost of carbon would depend on additional parameters that determine the
curvature of the growth path. Imposing linearity here is a simplification, as it reduces the number of
parameter values to be specified.
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A path of well-being described by (2.8) is feasible only if gc is sufficiently small.
Indeed, the longer the time horizon τ , the smaller gc must be to render the path (2.8)
feasible given the economic and climate constraints imposed by the DICE model.
In order to connect our approach of directly specifying the intertemporal distribu-
tion of well-being to the standard setting that uses a discounted utilitarian SWF as in
equation (3.6) we ask, for which time-varying intergenerational discount rates of well-
being would the streams of well-being that correspond to the different specifications
of cmax turn out to be optimal if these discount rates were used in a SWF as given
in equation (3.6)? The answer is that the path of well-being corresponding to a high
value of cmax is the optimal outcome if the discount rate is small, or, equivalently, the
discount factor is high. Hence, we next derive the endogenous social discount rate of
well-being. In other words, we determine the dual to the problem mainly considered
in this paper, which would be to maximize the present value of consumption, applying
the time path of social discount rates implied by the model considered here.
Using ϕt to denote the Lagrangian multiplier for the constraint
ct ≥ c¯t = c1−(1−
t
τ )
2
max c
(1− tτ )
2
0 (2.9)
derived from (2.5), everything else as in the derivation of efficient developments in
Appendix A.1.1, we find that the first-order conditions for this dynamic optimization
problem are formally identical to (A.3), except that (A.3a) is replaced by ϕt = λ
K
t for
all t.
Thus, we can interpret the expression ∆(t; τ) ≡ ϕt
ϕ0
as an intergenerational discount
factor of well-being, where we explicitly note the dependency on τ . The average
yearly intergenerational discount rate r¯ to arrive at the intergenerational discount
factor ∆(t; τ) for a specific time period t can then be defined as r¯ ≡ ∆(t; τ)−1/t − 1.
Furthermore, we define the time-dependent yearly intergenerational discout rate as
rt =
(
∆(t−1;τ)
∆(t;τ)
)
− 1.
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2.4 Quantitative results for the DICE model
Economic growth comes at a cost, since emitting one additional ton of CO2 into the
atmosphere causes future climate damage, which society should (in a normative sense)
consider in form of the social cost of carbon. The social cost of carbon associated with a
given intertemporal distribution of well-being at a particular point in time is measured
by the shadow price of CO2 divided by the shadow price of aggregate well-being at
this time. Within the optimal DICE framework that we consider here, the social cost
of carbon at this point in time must correspond to the societal cost of abating an
additional ton of CO2 at that time, for reasons of efficiency. Indeed Nordhaus (2014)
uses the marginal abatement cost function to calculate the social cost of carbon (see
Appendix 3 for the exact formula).
We are interested in how the social cost of carbon today varies with the sufficiency
level of steady-state well-being cmax and the corresponding intertemporal distribution
of well-being. Hence, we exogenously change τ and evaluate the corresponding optimal
social cost of carbon in 2015. The numerical dynamic optimization results presented in
the following have been calculated using the Knitro solver (version 9.0.1) together with
the AMPL optimization software. The programming code is provided in Appendix 4.
Figure 2.2 shows the time paths for well-being per capita for different sufficiency
levels of well-being, measured in multiples of the 2010 level of well-being, c0, cmax ∈
{2, 5, 10, 15, 18, 22, 26} × c0, under minimized end-of-growth horizons. The higher the
maximal level of well-being per capita the more the end-of-growth horizon is shifted
into the future for which cmax can efficiently be reached. The sub-graph in figure 2.2
illustrates that future growth in well-being per capita can only be implemented at the
expense of lower near term growth rates (2010-2030). The smaller the steady-state
level of well-being, the higher are the initial levels of well-being per capita from 2010
to 2030.
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Thus, figure 2.2 nicely summarizes the intergenerational trade-off that our global so-
ciety faces today: Achieving larger prosperity for future generations requires that the
current generation sacrifices part of its well-being. Vice versa the current generation
can be made better-off when the societal objective is to stop growing earlier implying
a lower future prosperity. However, the absolute sacrifice that the current generation
needs to make to enable larger future prosperity is relatively small compared to the
possible absolute future gain in well-being.
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Figure 2.2: Time paths (2010-2300) of well-being per capita for varying sufficient steady-state levels
of well-being cmax, with optimized end-of-growth horizon τ .
We are interested in how the level of sufficient steady state well-being drives the
social cost of carbon today. By varying the steady state level of well-being cmax that
society would consider “sufficient”, we are able to directly assess how the distribution
of growth between generations determines today’s cost of emitting an additional ton
of CO2 into the atmosphere. Figure 2.3 shows the social cost of carbon in 2015 as
a function of the sufficient steady-state levels of well-being cmax. We find that the
social cost of carbon in 2015 increases over-proportionally with the sufficiency level of
well-being. While the social cost of carbon in 2015 is US$ 7 if the sufficiency level is
four-fold the present level, it is US$ 30 if the sufficiency level is 15-fold and US$ 100
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Figure 2.3: Social cost of carbon in 2015 as a function of the sufficient level of steady-state well-being
cmax, measured in multiples of the 2010 level c0.
if the sufficiency level is 26-fold the present level. The convex relationship between
the sufficiency level of well-being and the social cost of carbon shows how strongly the
social cost of carbon depends on the desired prospects for growth. When thinking of
τ as measuring for how many generations a positive growth rate is maintained, the
trade-off between future growth in well-being and the social cost of carbon becomes
the more severe the larger the number of generations for which a society wants to keep
on growing and thus, the more weight society puts on intergenerational distributive
justice.
We can also compare the results of our approach with previous estimates of the
social cost of carbon (cf. figure 2.3). The scenario of Nordhaus (2008), i.e. a social cost
of carbon of US$ 8.18 per ton of CO2 in 2015, is roughly equivalent to a steady-state
level of well-being five times larger than the 2010 level. Increasing the sufficiency level
of well-being to 11.5 times the 2010 level matches the social cost of carbon in 2013
DICE model being 18.6 US$ per ton of CO2 (Nordhaus 2014). In turn, when growth
ends at a level 23 times the 2010 level, the social cost of carbon in 2015 is US$ 68.19,
equivalent to the scenario of Stern (2007).
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Figure 2.4: Left panel: Average endogenous intergenerational discount rate between 2010 and 2300
as a function of sufficient steady-state well-being cmax. Right panel: Endogenous intergenerational
discount rate over time for three different levels of sufficient steady-state well-being.
The left panel in figure 2.4 sheds some further light on how our approach of directly
specifying the intertemporal distribution of well-being relates to the standard setting
using a discounted utilitarian SWF: It depicts the average yearly intergenerational
discount rate6 for well-being per capita r¯(t; cmax) as a function of cmax, which would
result in the respective discount factor in year 2100, i.e. ∆(2100; cmax). The function
r¯(t; cmax) is a decreasing function of cmax reflecting that a higher level of steady-state
well-being is equivalent to a smaller intergenerational discount rate. The right panel
in figure 2.4 shows the implied intergenerational discount rates as a function of time
for three different steady-state levels of well-being. Clearly, these implied discount
rates are non-constant over time. They first increase only slowly (for a low level of
cmax), or decrease (for higher levels of cmax), and may temporarily imply negative
values (for high levels of cmax). Approaching the end-of-growth horizon τ , the implied
intergenerational discount rates increase strongly, reaching high values shortly before
the steady state is reached.
Comparing the results shown in Figures 2.3 and 2.4, we find that for the steady-
state level of well-being cmax ≈ 11.5 that leads to a social cost of carbon similar to
6For the purpose of our analysis here we do not distinguish between different drivers of the inter-
generational discount rate like the pure rate of time preference and the preference for intertemporal
consumption smoothing. What matters in this paper is the possibility of choosing between different
intertemporal distributions of well-being and acknowledging the implied social cost of carbon. The
reason we make the link to discounting in figure 2.4, is to transparently show the way it is possible
to switch from our approach back to the standard discounted utilitarian SWF setting.
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the value from Nordhaus (2014), the corresponding average intergenerational discount
rate is about 4.2% per year, which is in line with the Nordhaus model.
In short, our analysis makes the intergenerational trade-off in the light of anthro-
pogenic climate change very transparent: Increasing τ and thereby letting gct be more
evenly intertemporally distributed, raises both the social cost of carbon in 2015 and
the sacrifice in well-being for early generations.
2.5 Discussion and conclusions
Our paper explores how alternative social objectives on the intertemporal distribution
of well-being affect the social cost of carbon. Specifically, it opens a new perspective
for the lively debate on which parametrization of an intertemporal SWF should be
applied in climate economics, by shifting the focus directly on alternative specifications
of the intertemporal distribution of well-being, instead of alternative specifications of
an abstract welfare function.
Determining the time path of well-being that efficiently reaches a pre-specified
constant steady-state level of well-being after a finite “end-of-growth” time horizon
by means of dynamic optimization, we find that the social cost of carbon in 2015 is a
convex function of this sufficiency level of steady-state well-being. The convex effect
of the sufficiency level of well-being on the social cost of carbon is bounded above by
the availability of a backstop technology. Nordhaus and Sztorc (2013) and Nordhaus
(2014) assume that the initial backstop price is 344 US$ for 100% CO2 removal in
2010 and then exponentially declines over time. Hence, the societal price of achieving
a just intertemporal distribution in a carbon dependent economy also depends on the
availability of mitigation technologies.
The level of well-being that is desired in steady state is related to the weight society
puts on the well-being of future generations. In this respect, we find that a higher
emphasis on long-run growth of well-being strongly raises the social cost of carbon
today and increases the sacrifice in well-being for early generations. Consequently the
earlier the point of zero growth is reached, implying a more uneven distribution of
growth in well-being over time, the higher are the initial levels of per capita well-being
from 2010 to 2030.
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We acknowledge that for a policy-maker the specification of the steady-state level of
well-being may be of similar complexity as the choice of the social discount rate within
the standard approach of using a SWF. We believe, however, that a policy-maker could
find it easier to choose a target steady-state level of well-being cmax and understand the
respective implications for intergenerational justice as opposed to understand the effect
of the social discount rate being hidden in the SWF construct. Hence, although the
policy-maker can be thought of as indirectly deciding on intergenerational discounting
when choosing cmax, the direct choice of an intertemporal distribution of well-being
increases transparency for policy-makers and society.
By making the intergenerational trade-off in the light of anthropogenic climate
change more transparent, the results show that normative conceptions of intergener-
ational distributive justice crucially determine the social cost of carbon. Therefore
the knowledge of the overall societal goal in terms of the intertemporal distribution of
well-being should be the starting point of the integrated assessment of climate change.
Policy-makers then choose among different feasible paths of well-being as opposed to
discussing the “correct” parameters of the respective intertemporal SWF.
For the given modeling horizon of 300 years in DICE and an infinite end-of-growth
horizon, the intertemporal distribution of well-being would be determined by the max-
imal growth rate of well-being per capita that can be sustained for every period leading
to almost the maximal possible social cost of carbon of 344 US$ in 2015. But what
about the effect of extending the modeling horizon? Being an IAM, the DICE model
is designed to estimate optimal carbon prices for a finite time horizon. Nevertheless,
given that we are not aware of an appropriate time horizon to be considered in climate
change analysis, it is important to understand that the average optimized growth rate
of well-being per capita will decrease with increasing time-horizon. Moreover, as time
approaches infinity, the economy will have paid for both climate damages and abate-
ment costs. Thus, only the underlying one-sector growth model will be relevant from
which it is well-known that the per capita growth rate equals the growth rate of total
factor productivity, which equals zero as time approaches infinity.7 In short, an infinite
7Let g¯ be the average growth rate of well-being per capita. Then we have lim
t→∞ g
A
0 e
−5tδA =
lim
t→∞ g¯ = 0. See Appendix A.1.3 for detailed equations of the DICE model.
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end-of-growth horizon τ would be feasible within the DICE modeling horizon of 300
years, but not in general as growth will be zero in the limit, which makes sense for the
DICE-economy, were growth is not decoupled from carbon-intensive production.
Naturally the analysis in the paper is subject to limitations. Obviously, as we
use the DICE model, our quantitative results are subject to limitations build into the
DICE model. This includes that we ignore uncertainty, endogenous population and
directed technical change. To include, for example, uncertainty on the growth rate
of well-being, would be a difficult task since the whole approach we propose in this
paper relies on choosing among pathways of well-being per capita that are known with
certainty. Nevertheless, this could be an interesting future research project. Incorpo-
rating uncertainty on climate variables in turn, would not change the reasoning behind
our results, we conjecture. Moreover, well-being is solely determined by an index of in-
clusive consumption per capita and hence, abstracts from relative price effects of other
determinants of well-being. Sterner and Persson (2008) show that incorporating the
relative price of environmental quality in the measurement of well-being can increase
optimal emission abatement in DICE. Hence, besides using a lower intergenerational
discount rate, relative prices can be an additional argument for more stringent climate
policies. We suspect, however, that considering relative prices would not change the
qualitative insights of this paper as the relation between the intertemporal distribution
of well-being and the social cost of carbon is independent from the way well-being is
actually measured.
Furthermore, the set of pathways obtained by directly specifying our functional
form for the intertemporal distribution of well-being with different growth horizons τ is
limited by its underlying assumptions. Although we believe that these assumptions are
plausible and helpful to model the trade-off between the intergenerational distribution
of well-being and the social cost of carbon, they are entirely normative and thus,
subject to debate.
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A.1 Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1.1 Efficient development of the climate-economy system
In the following we sketch the generic framework of the integrated climate-economy
model according to the discrete-time DICE structure (Nordhaus and Sztorc 2013,
Nordhaus 2014). Functional forms and parameter specifications can be found in Ap-
pendix 2.
We useKt to denote the economy’s capital stock in period t, and Y (Lt, Kt, Et, T
AT
t , t)
to denote the production function. Output depends positively on labor Lt, which
changes over time due to population growth, the capital stock Kt, and carbon emis-
sions Et. Output decreases with the global mean atmospheric temperature, T
AT
t ,
which determines climate damages. Productivity increases over time due to exoge-
nous technical progress. Aggregate inclusive consumption8 in period t is Ct = Lt ct,
where Lt is population size and ct is per capita consumption. Using δ
K to denote the
proportional rate of capital depreciation, the national accounting equation reads
Kt+1 = (1− δK)Kt + Y (Lt, Kt, Et, TATt , t)− Lt ct accounting
(A.1a)
The atmospheric temperature develops according to
TATt+1 = T
AT
t + χ
1
[
Ft+1 − χ2TATt − χ3
(
TATt − TLOt
)]
atmospheric temperature
(A.1b)
where
Ft+1 = κ
[
log
(
MATt+1/M
AT
EQ
)
log 2
]
+ FEXt+1 (A.1c)
8Referred to as “consumption” from here on.
31
is radiative forcing, which depends on the atmospheric stock of Carbon, MATt . At-
mospheric temperature also reacts to the lower ocean temperature, which, in turn,
develops according to
TLOt+1 = T
LO
t + χ
4
(
TATt − TLOt
)
lower ocean temperature
(A.1d)
The carbon cycle is modeled by the following three-box model which stocks of carbon
in the atmosphere, MATt , the upper ocean, M
UP
t , and the lower ocean, M
LO
t . Carbon
emissions enter into the atmosphere. The entire carbon cycle is described by
MATt+1 = Et+1 +φ
11MATt +φ
21MUPt atmospheric carbon stock
(A.1e)
MUPt+1 = φ
12MATt +φ
22MUPt +φ
32MLOt upper ocean carbon stock
(A.1f)
MLOt+1 = φ
23MUPt +φ
33MLOt lower ocean carbon stock
(A.1g)
Given the initial states of capital, K0, resource, S0, carbon stocks, M
AT
0 , M
UP
0 , M
LO
0 ,
and temperatures, TAT0 and T
LO
0 , and given population and technology developments,
the set of equations (A.1) define all feasible consumption/emission paths. The question
is which among all feasible paths should be chosen. The answer to this question
determines the social cost of carbon, i.e. the shadow price of carbon emissions into the
atmosphere.
One natural restriction would be to choose only among the dynamically efficient
consumption/emissions paths. Assuming that well-being depends only on consump-
tion, a feasible path ct = (c0, c1, . . .) is dynamically efficient if no other feasible path
c′t = (c
′
0, c
′
1, . . . ) exists with c
′
t ≥ ct for all t and c′t > ct for at least one period t. The
dynamically efficient investment/emission path is found by maximizing per capita con-
sumption ctm at one period in time tm, keeping consumption at all other points in time
at some pre-specified feasible minimum levels, ct ≥ c¯t for all t 6= tm.
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Defining pitm = 1 and c¯tm = 0, the Lagrangian for this optimization problem can be
compactly written as
L =
∞∑
t=0
pit Lt (ct − c¯t) + λKt
(
(1− δK)Kt + Y (Lt, Kt, Et, TATt , t)− Lt ct −Kt+1
)
+λTATt
(
TATt + χ
1
[
κ
[
log
(
MATt+1/M
AT
EQ
)
log 2
]
+ FEXt+1 − χ2TATt − χ3
(
TATt − TLOt
)]− TATt+1
)
+ λTLOt
(
TLOt + χ
4
(
TATt − TLOt
)− TLOt+1)
+ λMATt
(
Et+1 + φ
11MATt + φ
21MUPt −MATt+1
)
+ λMUPt
(
φ12MATt + φ
22MUPt + φ
32MLOt −MUPt+1
)
+ λMLOt
(
φ23MUPt + φ
33MLOt −MLOt+1
)
, (A.2)
where pit is the Lagrangian multiplier for the constraint ct ≥ c¯t; λKt for the capital
accumulation constraint (4.7); λTATt for atmospheric temperature (A.1b); λ
TLO
t for the
temperature of the lower ocean (A.1d); and λMATt , λ
MUP
t , and λ
MLO
t for the carbon
stocks in the atmosphere, upper and lower ocean, respectively.
The first-order conditions describing an efficient development of the climate-economy
system can be written as follows. The conditions for the dynamically efficient con-
sumption and emission levels are
∂L
∂Ct
= 0 ⇔ pit = λKt (A.3a)
∂L
∂Et
= 0 ⇔ λKt YEt = −λMATt−1 (A.3b)
and the condition for the efficient intertemporal allocation of capital is
∂L
∂Kt
= 0 ⇔ λKt
(
1− δK + YKt
)
= λKt−1 (A.3c)
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The conditions for the efficient temperature dynamics capture the coupled dynamics of
the two temperature boxes, as well as damage caused by the atmospheric temperature
on production output.
∂L
∂TATt
= 0 ⇔ λTATt−1 = λTATt (1− χ1 (χ2 + χ3)) + λTLOt χ4 + λKt YTATt
(A.3d)
∂L
∂TLOt
= 0 ⇔ λTLOt−1 = λTATt χ1 χ3 + λTLOt (1− χ4). (A.3e)
Finally, the efficient dynamics of the carbon cycle are characterized by
∂L
∂MATt
= 0 ⇔ λMATt−1 = λMATt φ11+ λMUPt φ12 + λTATt−1
χ1 κ
log 2
1
MATt
(A.3f)
∂L
∂MUPt
= 0 ⇔ λMUPt−1 = λMATt φ21+ λMUPt φ22+ λMLOt φ23 (A.3g)
∂L
∂MLOt
= 0 ⇔ λMLOt−1 = λMUPt φ32+ λMLOt φ33, (A.3h)
capturing the dynamics of carbon flows between the three boxes and the effect of atmo-
spheric carbon on the atmospheric temperature. Conditions (A.3) together with (A.1)
characterize any Pareto-efficient dynamic path. The initial social cost of carbon, mea-
sured in units of consumption, along the Pareto-efficient path are given by the ratio
of the Lagrangian multiplier of atmospheric carbon, λMAT0 , and of consumption at
t = 0, λK0 . Clearly, the pre-specified consumption levels c¯t will have a major influence
on the social cost of carbon. Thus, a central question is how to distribute per-capita
consumption over time, i.e. which among the many Pareto-efficient paths to choose.
Maximizing (3.6) subject to (A.1) leads to conditions (A.3), but with (A.3a) re-
placed by
(1 + ρ)−t c−ηt = λ
K
t
(A.3c)⇔ (1 + ρ)
(
1 +
ct − ct−1
ct−1
)η
= 1 + YKt − δK , (A.4)
which is the discrete-time version of the well-known Ramsey rule (Dasgupta 2008).
This condition characterizes the intertemporal distribution of consumption that is
optimal according to (3.6).
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A.1.2 Proof of Theorem 1
In general there are trade-offs between Assumptions 3, 4, and 5, i.e. the preferences
for early growth, smooth growth, and efficiency. An intertemporal distribution of
well-being ct, t ∈ 0, T with some finite T > τ that is compatible with all three
Assumptions 3–5 is obtained by maximizing one of these three objectives while keeping
the other two at some minimum levels. Additionally imposing 1 and 2, a path of well-
being that is compatible with Assumptions 1–5 is characterized by the solution of the
following optimization problem.
max
{ct}τ0 ; cmax∈X
∫ T
0
ct dt subject to (A.5)
∫ τ
0
f (ct) dt ≥ σ (Lagrangian multiplier λ) (A.6)∫ τ
0
h(t− τ) ct dt ≥  (Lagrangian multiplier µ) (A.7)
ct = cmax for all t ≥ τ (Lagrangian multiplier νt), (A.8)
and c0 given, and where σ and  are levels of ‘smoothness’ and ‘earliness’ fixed at
feasible levels. In this formulation, the maximization (A.5) captures assumption 5 of
efficiency, i.e. to maximize aggregate well-being over time while not reducing smooth-
ness or earliness of growth below the respective given levels: constraint (A.6) captures
the preference for smooth growth (assumption 4), constraint (A.7) captures the prefer-
ence for early growth (assumption 3), constraint (A.8) the assumption that a sufficient
level of well-being is maintained after the end-of-growth horizon τ (assumption 2), and
finally the initial condition captures assumption 1.
The Lagrangian for the optimization problem is L =
∫ T
0
ct dt+λ
(
σ − ∫ τ
0
f(ct) dt
)
+
µ
(
− ∫ τ
0
h(t− τ) ct dt
)
and the first-order conditions for choosing ct efficiently for all
t < τ read
1− µh(t− τ)− λ f ′ (ct) = 0. (A.9)
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Note that µ and λ are time-invariant. Their values depend on the references values σ
for smooth growth and  for early growth. Rearranging we obtain
⇔ ct = f ′−1
(
1− µh(t− τ)
λ
)
. (A.10)
Using the boundary condition cτ = cmax we obtain
cmax = f
′−1
(
1
λ
)
⇔ λ = 1
f ′(cmax)
(A.11)
The initial condition yields
c0 = f
′−1
(
1− µh(−τ)
λ
)
⇔ µ = 1
h(−τ)
(
1− f
′(c0)
f ′(cmax)
)
,
(A.12)
where we have used the expression for λ derived above. Using (A.11) and (A.12)
in (A.10) we obtain (2.6). For t ≥ τ , the first-order condition for the efficient level
of ct is 1 = νt. The derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to cmax is equal to
νt = 1 > 0. Thus, cmax is to be chosen at the maximum feasible level as specified in
the theorem. Note that the given assumptions characterize the preferred paths of well-
being in a rather restrictive way. Given c0 and τ (Assumptions 1 and 2), and choosing
cmax at the maximum feasible level (Assumption 5) fully determines the ‘earliness’ and
‘smoothness’ of the path – there are no further degrees of freedom. Alternatively one
could choose earliness or smoothness at the maximum feasible levels, but then the
other of the two as well as aggregate consumption would be fixed.
As the last step of the proof, we verify that the path of well-being characterized
by (2.6) is monotonic in time. This is the case, as f ′−1(·) is a decreasing function (due
to the assumed concavity of f(·)) and as
d
dt
(
f ′(cmax)
(
1 +
h(t− τ)
h(−τ)
(
f ′(c0)
f ′(cmax)
− 1
)))
=
h′(t− τ)
h(−τ) (f
′(c0)− f ′(cmax)) Q 0 if c0 Q cmax.
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A.1.3 DICE-2013R model
Table 2.2: DICE 2013R, Data (1)
Parameter Unity Equation
Preferences
Time preference rate / year - ρ = 0.015
Elasticity of marginal utility of consumption - η = 1.45
Population and technology
Capital elasticity - γ = 0.3
Initial world population Millions L0 = 6838
Population growth rate - gL = 0.134
Depreciation rate of capital / year - δK = 0.1
Initial world gross output Trillions 2005 US$ Y Gross0 = 63.69
Initial capital Trillion 2005 US$ K0 = 135
Initial level of total factor productivity (TFP) - A0 = 3.8
Initial growth rate of TFP / period - gA0 = 0.079
Decline rate of TFP / period - δA = 0.006
37
Table 2.3: DICE 2013R, Data (2)
Parameter Unity Equation
Emissions
Initial industrial emissions Gigatons CO2 E
Ind
0 = 33.61
Initial emissions control rate - µ0 = 0.039
Emissions control rate 2010-2150 - µ = [0, 1]
Emissions control rate 2150-2310 - µ = [0, 1.2]
Initial land emissions Gigatons CO2 E
Land
0 = 3.3
Initial cumulative emissions Gigatons CO2 E
Cum
0 = 90
Initial carbon intensity Kilograms CO2 σ0 =
EInd0
Y Gross(1−µ0)
Initial growth of carbon intensity - gsigma0 = −0.01
Decline rate of carbon intensity / period - δσ = −0.001
Carbon cycle
Initial concentration atmosphere Gigatons carbon MAT0 = 830.4
Initial concentration upper oceans Gigatons carbon MUP0 = 1527
Initial concentration deep oceans Gigatons carbon MLO0 = 10010
Equilibrium concentration atmosphere Gigatons carbon MATEQ = 588
Equilibrium concentration upper oceans Gigatons carbon MUPEQ = 1350
Equilibrium concentration deep oceans Gigatons carbon MUPEQ = 10000
Flow atmosphere to atmosphere - φ11 = 1− φ12
Flow upper oceans to atmosphere - φ21 = φ12
MATEQ
MUPEQ
Flow atmosphere to upper oceans - φ12 = 0.088
Flow upper oceans to upper oceans - φ22 = 1− φ21 − φ23
Flow deep oceans to upper oceans - φ32 = φ23
MUPEQ
MLOEQ
Flow upper oceans to deep oceans - φ23 = 0.0025
Flow deep oceans to deep oceans - φ11 = 1− φ12
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Table 2.4: DICE 2013R, Data (3)
Parameter Unity Equation
Climate model
Equilibrium climate sensitivity ◦C increase /doubling of CO2 ν = 2.9
Forcing due to equilibrium CO2 doubling Watts / square meter κ = 3.8
2010 forcing of non-CO2 GHG Watts / square meter F
EX
0 = 0.25
2100 forcing of non-CO2 GHG Watts / square meter F18
EX = 0.7
Initial atmospheric temperature change ◦C from 1750 TAT0 = 0.8
Initial deep oceans temperature change ◦C from 1750 TLO0 = 0.0068
Speed of adjustment atmospheric temperature - χ1 = 0.098
Equilibrium forcing /doubling of CO2 - χ2 = κ/ν
Heat loss from atmosphere to deep oceans - χ3 = 0.088
Heat gain of deep oceans - χ4 = 0.025
Climate change abatement costs
Damage quadratic term - ψ = 0.00267
Initial abatement costs Trillions 2005 US$ Λ0 = 0
Exponent of abatement cost function - Θ = 2.8
Initial backstop price 2005 US$ pBack0 = 344
Decline rate of backstop price / period - gBack
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Table 2.5: DICE 2013R, Exogenous equations
Parameter Unity Equation
Total population Millions Lt = Lt−1
(
10500
Lt−1
)gL
Total factor productivity (TFP) - At =
At−1
1−gAt−1
Growth rate TFP per period - gAt = g
A
0 e
−5tδA
Total factor productivity (TFP) - At =
At−1
1−gAt−1
Carbon intensity Kilograms CO2 / output σt = σt−1e−5g
σ
t−1
Growth rate of carbon intensity / period - gσt =
gσt−1
(1+δσ)5
External forcing Watts / square meter FEXt = F
EX
0 +
1
18
(
FEX18 − FEX0
)
(t+ 2)
Backstop price 2005 US$ / ton of CO2 pBackt = pBackt−1
(
1− gBack)
Adjusted cost factor for backstop 2005 US$ / ton of CO2 pˆtBack =
pBackt σt
1000 θ40
Table 2.6: DICE 2013R, Endogenous equations
Parameter Unity Equation
Welfare under Nordhaus - W0(c0, c1, c2, . . . ) =
60∑
t=0
1
(1+ρ)5tLt
c1−ηt
1−η
Total emissions Gigatons CO2 Et = E
Ind
t + E
Land
t
Carbon concentration atmosphere Gigatons carbon MATt =
5
3.666Et + φ
11MATt−1 + φ
21MUPt−1
Carbon concentration upper oceans Gigatons carbon MUPt = φ
12MATt−1 + φ
22MUPt−1 + φ
32MLOt−1
Carbon concentration lower oceans Gigatons carbon MLOt = φ
23MUPt−1 + φ
33MLOt−1
Total radiative forcing Watts / square meter Ft = κ
[
log(MATt /M
AT
EQ)
log 2
]
+ FEXt
Atmospheric temperature change ◦C from 1750 TATt = T
AT
t−1 + χ
[
Ft − χ2TATt−1 − χ3
(
TATt−1 − TLOt−1
)]
Upper ocean temperature change ◦C from 1750 TLOt = T
LO
t−1 + χ
4
(
TATt−1 − TLOt−1
)
Capital Trillions 2005 US$ Kt =
(
1− δK)5Kt−1 + 5It−1
Gross output Trillions 2005 US$ Y Gross = At
(
Lt
1000
)1−γ
Kγt
Industrial emissions Gigatons CO2 E
Ind
t = σt (1− µt)Y Gross
Cumulative emissions Gigatons carbon ECumt = E
Cum
t−1 +
5
3.666E
Ind
t−1 ≤ 6000
Abatement costs Trillions 2005 US$ Λt = Y Grosst pˆt
BackµΘt
Damage fraction - Ωt = Ψ(T
AT
t )
2
Net output Trillions 2005 US$ Yt =
[
Y Grosst (1− Ωt)
]− Λt
Consumption Trillions 2005 US$ Ct = Yt − It
Consumption per capita Thousands 2005 US$ ct = 1000 CtLt
Social cost of carbon 2005 US$ / ton of carbon pct = pBackt µ
Θ−1
t
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A.1.4 AMPL programming code
# PARAMETERS
# modeling horizon
param T:=60;
# population and technology
param gamma:=0.3; # capital elasticity in production function
param L0:=6838; # initial world population (millions)
param gL:=0.134; # initial growth rate of world population per period
such that popasymt=10500
param L {t in 0..T}>=0;
let L[0]:=L0;
let {t in 1..T} L[t]:=L[t-1]*((10500/L[t-1])^gL);
param deltaK:=0.1; #depreciation rate on capital per year
param Qgross0:=63.69; #initial world gross output (trillions 2005 USD)
param K0:=135; #initial capital value (trillions 2005 USD)
param A0:=3.8; #initial level of total factor productivity (TFP)
param gA0:=0.079; #initial growth rate for TFP per period
param deltaA:=0.006; #decline rate of TFP per period
param gA {t in 0..T}>=0; # growth rate for TFP per period
let {t in 0..T} gA[t]:=gA0*exp(-deltaA*5*(t));
param A {t in 0..T}>=0; # TFP
let A[0]:=A0;
let {t in 1..T} A[t]:=A[t-1]/(1-gA[t-1]);
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# emission parameters
param gsigma0:=-0.01; #initial growth rate of sigma (coninuous per year)
param deltasigma:=-0.001; #decline rate of decarbonization per period
param ELand0:=3.3; # initial land emissions(GtCO2)
param deltaLand:=0.2; #decline rate of land emissions per period
param EInd0:=33.61; # initial industrial emissions(GtCO2)
param Ecum0:=90; #initial cumulative emissions (GtC)
param mu0:=0.039; # initial emissions control rate
param Lambda0:=0; # initial abatement costs(trillions 2005 USD)
param sigma0:=EInd0/(Qgross0*(1-mu0)); #initial carbon intensity(kgCO2 per output)
param gsigma {t in 0..T}; # growth rate of carbon intensity per period
let gsigma[0]:=gsigma0;
let {t in 1..T} gsigma[t]:=gsigma[t-1]*((1+deltasigma)^5);
param sigma {t in 0..T}>=0; # carbon intensity(kgCO2 per output of 2005 USD)
let sigma[0]:=sigma0;
let {t in 1..T} sigma[t]:=sigma[t-1]*exp(gsigma[t-1]*5);
param ELand {t in 0..T}>=0; # land emissions per period (GtCO2)
let ELand[0]:=ELand0;
let {t in 1..T} ELand[t]:=ELand [t-1]*(1-deltaLand);
# carbon cycle
param MAT0=830.4; # initial concentration in atmosphere(GtC)
param MUP0:=1527; # initial concentration in upper ocean/biosphere(GtC)
param MLO0:=10010; # initial concentration in deep oceans(GtC)
param MATEQ:=588; # equilibrium concentration in atmosphere
(preindustrial atmospheric carbon) (GtC)
param MUPEQ:=1350; # equilibrium concentration in upper ocean/biosphere (GtC)
param MLOEQ:=10000; # equilibrium concentration in deep oceans(GtC)
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# flow parameters (carbon cycle transition matrix)
param phi12:=0.088;
param phi23:=0.00250;
param phi11=1-phi12;
param phi21=phi12*MATEQ/MUPEQ;
param phi22=1-phi21-phi23;
param phi32=phi23*MUPEQ/MLOEQ;
param phi33=1-phi32;
# climate model parameters
param nu:=2.9; # equilibrium climate sensitivity (°C per doubling CO2)
param kappa:=3.8; # forcing of equilibrium CO2 doubling (Wm-2)
param Fex0:=0.25; # 2010 forcing of non-C02 GHG (Wm-2)
param Fex18:=0.70; # 2100 forcing of non-C02 GHG (Wm-2)
param Fex {t in 0..T}=Fex0+1/18*(Fex18-Fex0)*(2+t); # external forcing (Wm-2)
param TLO0:=0.0068; # initial temperature change of upper ocean/biosphere
(°C from 1750)
param TAT0:=0.80; # initial atmospheric temperature change (°C from 1750)
param xi1:=0.098; # speed of adjustment parameter for atmospheric temperature
param xi2=kappa/nu; # climate model parameter
param xi3:=0.088; # coefficient of heat loss from atmosphere
to upper oceans/biosphere
param xi4:=0.025; # coefficient of heat gain by deep oceans
# climate damage parameters
param Psi:=0.00267; # damage quadratic term
# abatement cost
param Theta:=2.8; # exponent of abatement cost function
param pback0:=344; # initial backstop price(2005 USD per tCO2)
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param gback:=0.025; # decline rate of backstop price per period
param pback {t in 0..T}>=0; # backstop price(2005 USD per tCO2)
let pback[0]:=pback0;
let {t in 1..T} pback[t]:=pback[t-1]*(1-gback);
param phead {t in 0..T}=pback[t]*sigma[t]/Theta/1000;
# adjusted cost factor for backstop
# VARIABLES # Upper and lower bounds for stability according to Nordhaus (2013)
# capital(trillions 2005 USD)
var K {t in 0..T}>=1;
# Gross output(trillions 2005 USD)
var Qgross {t in 0..T}=A[t]*((L[t]/1000)^(1-gamma))*(K[t]^gamma);
# carbon atmosphere (GtC)
var MAT {t in 0..T}>=10;
# carbon upper ocean (GtC)
var MUP {t in 0..T}>=100;
# carbon lower ocean (GtC)
var MLO {t in 0..T}>=1000;
# total radiative forcing (Wm-2)
var F {t in 0..T}=kappa*((log(MAT[t]/MATEQ))/log(2))+Fex[t];
# atmospheric temperature change (°C from 1750)
var TAT {t in 0..T}>=0,<=40;
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# ocean temperature change (°C from 1750)
var TLO {t in 0..T}>=-1, <=20;
# damage fraction
var Omega {t in 0..T}=Psi*(TAT[t])^2;
# damages(trillions 2005 USD)
var damage {t in 0..T}=Omega[t]*Qgross[t];
# emission control rate
var mu {t in 0..T}>=0;
# abatement costs as fraction of output(trillions 2005 USD)
var Lambda {t in 0..T}=Qgross[t]*phead[t]*(mu[t]^Theta);
# industrial emissions (GtCO2)
var EInd {t in 0..T}=sigma[t]*Qgross[t]*(1-mu[t]);
# total emissions (GtCO2)
var E {t in 0..T}=EInd[t]+ELand[t];
# maximum cumulative extraction fossil fuels (GtC)
var Ecum {t in 0..T}<=6000;
# Marginal cost of abatement (social cost of carbon)(2005 USD per tCO2)
var cprice {t in 0..T}=pback[t]*mu[t]^(Theta-1);
# output net of damages and abatement(trillions 2005 USD)
var Q {t in 0..T}=(Qgross[t]*(1-Omega[t]))-Lambda[t];
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# per capita consumption (1000s 2005 USD]
param cmax default 178.88;
param c0 default 6.88;
var tau >=0;
var c {t in 0..T} = cmax^(1-(1-t/tau)^2)*c0^((1-t/tau)^2);
# aggregate consumption (trillions 2005 USD)
var C {t in 0..T} = L[t]*c[t]/1000;
# Investment(trillions 2005 USD)
var I {t in 0..T}>=0;
# OBJECTIVE FUNCTION
minimize objective_function: tau;
subject to constr_accounting {t in 0..T}: c[t]=1000*(Q[t]-I[t])/L[t];
subject to constr_capital_dynamics {t in 1..T}: K[t]=(1-deltaK)^5*K[t-1]+5*I[t-1];
subject to constr_cumulativeemissions {t in 1..T}:
Ecum[t]=Ecum[t-1]+(EInd[t-1]*5/3.666);
subject to constr_atmosphere {t in 1..T}:
MAT[t]=E[t]*(5/3.666)+phi11*MAT[t-1]+phi21*MUP[t-1];
subject to constr_upper_ocean {t in 1..T}:
MUP[t]=phi12*MAT[t-1]+phi22*MUP[t-1]+phi32*MLO[t-1];
subject to constr_lower_ocean {t in 1..T}:
MLO[t]=phi23*MUP[t-1]+phi33*MLO[t-1];
subject to constr_atmospheric_temp {t in 1..T}:
TAT[t]=TAT[t-1]+xi1*((F[t]-xi2*TAT[t-1])-(xi3*(TAT[t-1]-TLO[t-1])));
subject to constr_ocean_temp {t in 1..T}:
TLO[t]=TLO[t-1]+xi4*(TAT[t-1]-TLO[t-1]);
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# Initial conditions
subject to initial_capital: K[0] = K0;
subject to initial_Ecum: Ecum[0]=Ecum0;
subject to initial_MAT: MAT[0]=MAT0;
subject to initial_MUP: MUP[0]=MUP0;
subject to initial_MLO: MLO[0]=MLO0;
subject to initial_TLO: TLO[0]=TLO0;
subject to initial_TAT: TAT[0]=TAT0;
subject to control1 {t in 1..28}: mu[t]<=1;
subject to control2 {t in 29..T}: mu[t]<=1.2;
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Abstract: This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the relative price of non-
market vis-a´-vis market goods and its impact on climate policy evaluation. As non-
market goods are projected to become scarcer compared to market goods, it is in-
creasingly important to consider changing relative prices when evaluating long-term
policies. Based on the climate-economy model DICE and recent empirical evidence,
we propose a plausible range for relative price changes. For our central calibration, the
relative price change amounts to 4.4 percent in 2020 and 2 percent in 2100. Neglecting
relative prices leads to an underestimation of the social cost of carbon of more than
40 percent in 2020. We furthermore show that accounting for relative price changes
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3.1 Introduction
Relative prices are central to economics and their changes inherent in the structural
transformation of economies over time. While we can easily infer relative prices from
market data for most goods, estimating them for non-marketed goods poses a special
challenge. In light of the continuous growth of the global economy and a loss of non-
market goods, such as environmental goods (MEA 2005; IPCC 2014), at the same time,
accounting for changes in the relative price of non-market goods vis-a´-vis market goods
is crucial for evaluating long-term policies like climate change mitigation.2
This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the change in the relative price
of non-market goods in terms of market goods, its determinants and its impact on
climate policy evaluation. This is closely connected to the discussion on discounting
the future, as the difference in good-specific discount rates amounts to the change in
relative prices over time. The debate on how to value future costs and benefits that
ensued after the publication of the Stern Review initially focused on the contentious
rate of pure time preference (Nordhaus 2007, 2008; Stern 2007), but it quickly shifted
to examining extensions to the standard discounting framework. Besides issues of risk
and uncertainty, considering relative prices has been one of the extensions receiving
wide-spread attention.3 Yet until today, there exists no systematic study of relative
prices changes of non-market goods. The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap. In
particular we study different drivers of relative price changes and quantify implications
for the integrated assessment of climate change policy.
2Relative price changes are determined by the difference in growth rates and the degree of substi-
tutability between goods. Suppose that the relative price of, say, biodiversity increases by 2 percent
per year, such as when market goods grow at 2 percent, biodiversity remains constant and there is
Cobb-Douglas substitutability. Within 100 years, the value of a unit of biodiversity in terms of a
market good unit would increase by 617 percent. Hence, it is crucial to take relative price changes
into account.
3See, for example, Arrow et al. (2013), Dasgupta (2008), Gollier (2012), Gollier and Hammitt
(2014), Sterner and Persson (2008), and Weitzman (2007, 2009). In his recent review on The Eco-
nomics of the Climate, Heal (2017) discusses concerns about limited substitutability after discounting
and before uncertainty. Furthermore, environmental scarcity and associated relative price changes
has been among the most-mentioned issues missing in discounting guidance in a recent expert survey
(Drupp et al. 2015).
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The literature has developed two approaches to dealing with relative price changes.4
The first approach uses ‘dual discount rates’ and discounts consumption streams for
market and non-market goods separately.5 The second approach computes com-
prehensive consumption equivalents for each period, by appropriately valuing non-
market goods using relative prices, and discounts this aggregated bundle with a single
consumption-equivalent discount rate. The relative price of non-market goods is given
by the marginal rate of substitution between consuming a further unit of non-market
goods relative to market goods. What has been termed the ‘relative price effect’ in
the literature (Hoel and Sterner 2007) is the change of the relative price of non-market
goods over time. It is determined by the degree of substitutability between market
and non-market goods as well as the difference in their (weighted) growth rates.
Relying on constant, exogenous growth rates for environmental goods at the global
level and on substitutability estimates derived from non-market valuation studies,
Baumga¨rtner et al. (2015) and Drupp (2016) estimate that the yearly relative price
change for environmental goods amounts to around 1 percent. These estimates en-
couraged the Netherlands to consider relative price changes in policy guidance for
cost-benefit analysis and to recommend discounting the consumption of environmental
goods at a lower rate than for market goods (Hepburn and Groom 2017; Koetse et al.
2017; MFN 2015). Yet, in general, the growth rate of non-market goods is non-constant
and endogenous to how we manage climate change, for instance. Our analysis therefore
builds on an integrated assessment model following Sterner and Persson (2008), who
first highlighted the importance of considering relative prices for climate policy. They
assumed that non-market goods are complementary to consumption goods and argued
that optimal climate policy—when introducing relative prices—should be more strin-
gent than as advocated in the Stern Review, even when using the considerably higher
rate of pure time preference of Nordhaus (2007). As changes in relative prices play a
crucial role for the appraisal of long-term public projects, it is imperative to scrutinize
the potential quantitative magnitude of the relative price effect, its determinants as
4See, among others, Baumga¨rtner et al. (2015), Drupp (2016), Gollier (2010), Gueant et al. (2012),
Guesnerie (2004), Hoel and Sterner (2007), Traeger (2011), Weikard and Zhu (2005).
5This is the only viable approach if non-market goods and consumption goods are perfect comple-
ments (Weikard and Zhu 2005). Otherwise, the two approaches are equivalent and, at each point in
time, the difference in the good-specific discount rates corresponds to the change in relative prices.
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well as its implications for climate policy evaluation more closely.
We perform our analysis of relative prices in the latest version of the integrated
assessment model DICE (Nordhaus 2017).6 We proceed as follows. Section 3.2 defines
the relative price effect of non-market goods in a stylized model and subsequently
presents how the DICE model can be adapted to explicitly consider relative prices.
In line with previous work, we consider non-market goods at a highly aggregate level,
encompassing goods related to human health as well as environmental goods, which
range from clean water to aesthetic beauty. As many readers will be familiar with
the study by Sterner and Persson (2008) as a natural benchmark, we initially draw on
all their components for introducing relative prices into the most recent DICE version
in Section 3.3. Following from this replication, we clarify how relative price changes
should be interpreted and show that the standard DICE model already—implicitly—
contains a sizable relative price effect, which has so far not been observed in the
literature. Thus, explicitly introducing relative prices into the integrated assessment
of climate change can lead to more but also less stringent optimal climate policy as
compared to Nordhaus (2017). It also follows from this analysis that if non-market
goods are as complementary to market goods as assumed by Sterner and Persson
(2008), the impact of considering relative prices may be even more pronounced than
suggested previously.
Section 3.4 scrutinizes the impact of the different determinants of relative price
changes in both the short and the long run. These determinants include the degree
of substitutability between market and non-market goods, the magnitude of non-
market climate damages and a potential subsistence requirement in terms of non-
market goods. We also study how the rate of pure time preference, the elasticity of
marginal utility of consumption and technological progress affect relative price changes
through the endogenous growth rate of market goods. The degree of substitutability
turns out to be the key driver of relative price changes. While the elasticity of marginal
utility of consumption and pure time preference matter considerably in the short-run,
6Integrated assessment models (IAM), such as DICE, are subject to substantial critique (Pindyck
2017). Our aim is to systematically explore the relative effect sizes of different drivers of climate
policy evaluation. Although closed-form analytic climate models start to emerge (van den Bijgaart
et al. 2016; Rezai and van der Ploeg 2016; Traeger 2015), IAMs still represent a useful tool for such
purposes.
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technological progress exerts its influence on relative price changes only in the longer
run.
In Section 3.5, we combine the two previous steps of the analysis. Based on our
systematic study of the individual determinants of the relative price effect, we con-
struct plausible ranges for each of the drivers and perform a Monte Carlo analysis
to determine the range of values for the relative price effect and three climate policy
measures. When combining the plausible ranges of all six drivers, the resulting 95
percent interval for the relative price effect ranges from 1.3 to 9.6 percent in 2020 and
from 0.8 to 3.6 percent in 2100. In our central calibration, the relative price effect
amounts to 4.4 percent in the year 2020 and decreases to 2.0 percent in the year 2100.
In terms of climate policy evaluation, we find that neglecting relative prices would lead
to an underestimation of the social cost of carbon of around 43 (68) percent in the year
2020 (2100), and to a stabilization of temperature change that is 0.5◦C higher. Using
peak temperature as a comparison metric, we show that considering relative prices is
equivalent to reducing the rate of pure time preference by more than 0.5 percentage
points.
While there are inevitably a number of limitations of our analysis, which we discuss
in Section 3.6 , we overall conclude that changes in relative prices are of considerable
magnitude compared to conventional considerations in the economic evaluation of
climate change policy. Section 3.7 closes by drawing implications for governmental
project appraisal and climate policy.
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3.2 Modeling relative prices
3.2.1 A simple model of relative price changes
The well-being of a representative agent is determined by the consumption of two
goods – a market-traded private consumption good C, with c as consumption per-
capita, and a non-market good E. Both goods may be interpreted as composites
with continuously scalable amounts. The agent may require an amount E of the non-
market good to satisfy her subsistence needs (Baumga¨rtner et al. 2017; Heal 2009).7
The agent’s preferences are represented by a utility function
U(E, c) =
 Ul(E) for E ≤ EUh(E, c) else . (3.1)
If the subsistence requirement is met (E > E), which we assume throughout the
remainder of this paper, utility is given by:
Uh(E, c) =
[
α
(
E − E)θ + (1− α) cθ]1/θ with −∞ < θ ≤ +1, θ 6= 0; 0 < α < 1,
(3.2)
where θ is the substitutability parameter, and α is a share parameter for the weight of
the environmental good in utility.8 In the standard constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) case without a subsistence requirement (E = 0), which forms the workhorse of
previous research on relative prices, the elasticity of substitution σ is solely determined
by the exogenous substitutability parameter θ, with σ =
1
1− θ .
9 In the presence of
a subsistence requirement, this direct relationship breaks down and the elasticity of
substitution depends also on other determinants besides θ (Baumga¨rtner et al. 2017).
For the intertemporal setting, we build on Baumga¨rtner et al. (2015), Drupp (2016),
Gueant et al. (2012), Hoel and Sterner (2007), Traeger (2011) and Weikard and Zhu
(2005): A social planner has perfect knowledge about the future and maximizes a
7Examples may include food, water and air necessary for survival, or cultural goods such as sacred
sites that the agent would not be willing to trade-off. In terms of environmental goods, this may also
be thought of as a preference-based measure of a ‘planetary boundary’ (Rockstro¨m et al. 2009).
8 The extension of Uh(E, c) for θ→0 is a special Cobb-Douglas-Stone-Geory case:
(
E − E)α c(1−α).
9 Important special cases of the elasticity of substitution are perfect substitutes (θ = 1; σ =∞),
Cobb-Douglas (θ = 0; σ = 1) and perfect complements (θ → −∞; σ = 0).
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constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution (CIES) social welfare function based
on the instantaneous utility function Uh (Equation 3.2). Welfare is given by
W (Et, ct, Lt) =
T∑
t=0
Lt
1
(1 + δ)t
1
1− η
[
α(Et − E)θ + (1− α)ctθ
] 1−η
θ , (3.3)
where Lt is period t
′s population size, δ is the rate of pure time preference and η is the
inverse of the CIES with respect to the within-period aggregate consumption bundle
c˜(θ, E) =
[
α(Et − E)θ + (1− α)(ct)θ
] 1
θ . This is often referred to as the elasticity of
the marginal utility of consumption (equivalents).
We now turn to the focus of our analysis: the ‘relative price effect of non-market
goods’ (hereafter denoted as RPE). The value of non-market goods measured in terms
of the market good numeraire is UE/Uc, which is the implicit ‘price’ of environmental
goods.10 This tells us by how much the consumption of market goods would need to
increase for a marginal decrease in non-market goods to hold utility constant. The
RPE measures the change in this valuation of non-market goods, and thus their
relative scarcity over time (Hoel and Sterner 2007, Eq. 7):
RPEt =
d
dt
(
UE
Uc
)
(
UE
Uc
) . (3.4)
For the utility function with a non-market subsistence requirement (Equation 3.2),
the relative price effect RPE at time t reads (see Appendix B.1.1 for a derivation):
RPEt = (1− θ)
[
gct −
Et
Et − E
gEt
]
.11 (3.5)
The RPE depends on the degree of substitutability θ between market and non-market
goods, their growth rates gct and gEt as well as on the consumption of non-market
goods over and above the subsistence requirement Et
Et−E .
10This assumes that the two goods are imperfect complements (θ > −∞).
11The ‘relative price effect of non-market goods’ is the same as the difference in the two good
specfic discount rates for market and non-market goods. This was first demonstrated by Weikard
and Zhu (2005); See Drupp (2016) for a derivation of Equation 3.5 with subsistence consumption.
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3.2.2 Relative prices in integrated assessment
Integrated assessment models (IAM) are a widespread tool for quantitatively analyz-
ing climate-economy feedbacks and thus useful for studying the dynamic impacts of
considering the relative price changes. We use the most recent version of the global Dy-
namic Integrated Climate-Economy (DICE-2016R) model by Nordhaus (1992 - 2017).
It combines a Ramsey-Economy with a simple climate module through a negative
feedback loop of the atmospheric temperature on economic output. A representative
agent maximizes her population-weighted and discounted value of the utility of per
capita consumption within a finite time horizon of 100 periods each encompassing 5
years.
To explicitly incorporate relative prices in the spirit of Sterner and Persson (2008)
into DICE-2016R, we need to modify the social welfare function and the damage
function from climate change. First we present how Nordhaus (2017) models social
welfare and damages and, second, report the changes necessary to explicitly include
relative prices. The social welfare function in Nordhaus (2017) is given by:
W0(c0, c1, c2, . . . ) =
100∑
t=0
Lt
1
(1 + δ)t
c˜1−ηt
1− η . (3.6)
Comprehensive consumption per-capita c˜t is defined as an index of generalized
consumption (Nordhaus and Szork 2013), which is meant to also include non-market
damages but no subsistence requirement (i.e. E = 0). Total climate damages Dφ are
expressed as a percentage of the global economy’s aggregate output and depend on
the squared change in atmospheric temperature T compared to pre-industrial levels:
Dφ = φ T
2
t (3.7)
Nordhaus (2017) calibrates the aggregate scaling parameter for the damages on all
generalized consumption goods via production-damages, φ (Equation 3.7), such that
market plus non-market damages are equal to 2.12 percent of global output for a tem-
perature increase of 3◦C. These total damages include 25 percent non-market damages
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additional to market damages, which amount to 1.63 percent of global output.12 Thus,
there is perfect substitutability between market and non-market damages. From this
one might infer that there is also perfect substitutability between market and non-
market goods in DICE (e.g. Neumayer 1999; Sterner and Persson 2008). Yet, this is
not the case: Since overall damages—which include non-market damages—enter multi-
plicatively into what is a Cobb-Douglas production function of labor and capital at its
core, the DICE model implicitly includes a relative price effect of non-market goods.13
Thus, while there is perfect substitutability in damages in the standard DICE, there
is limited substitutability in terms of goods.
To explicitly consider relative prices in DICE, we extend the model such that
utility depends not only on market but also on non-market goods. To replicate the
results of Sterner and Persson (2008) within DICE-2016R, we follow their approach in
extending the DICE framework to a two-good setting. Specifically we use the welfare
function defined in (3.3), with T = 100 periods of 5 years each. First, we assume that
the initial level of the aggregate non-market good E0 is equal to the initial level of
consumption of market goods (C0 = c0×L0). Second, we assume that the evolution of
the non-market good depends (inversely) on the square of the change in atmospheric
temperature T compared to pre-industrial levels and the damage parameter ψ:
Et =
E0
[1 + ψT 2t ]
. (3.8)
Third, we follow Sterner and Persson’s (2008) assumption that non-market damages
double the loss in consumption of marketed goods to re-calibrate φ. Thus, we include
an additional 100 percent non-market damages on top of market damages. Hence, for
12Nordhaus (2017) builds on 36 studies that estimate climate damages and adds 25 percent to each
damage estimate to incorporate non-market damages. These estimates are treated as data drawn
from an underlying damage function and φ is calibrated by equating it with the coefficient of the
impact of squared temperature change on climate damage estimates from an median, quadratic,
weighted regression (see Nordhaus and Moffat (2017) for more details).
13It is not straightforward to back out the degree of substitutability already contained in the
DICE model. First, non-market damages only indirectly affect market consumption goods through
production. Second, the production function is not just Cobb-Douglas between labor and capital (and
total factor productivity), among others due to abatement. Third, the DICE model does not directly
consider exhaustible and polluting resources as production inputs (see Riekhof and Bro¨cker (2017)
for such an extension to DICE). Our computations in Section 3.3 recover the Nordhaus comparison
path in an explicit relative prices model for a mild degree of complementarity.
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the baseline Nordhaus (2017) model we assume that market plus non-market damages
are equal to 3.26 percent of global output for a temperature increase of 3◦C. These
total climate damages have to be disentangled into damages on market and non-market
goods. Two new damage parameters ψ [κ] now scale up the magnitude of non-market
[market] damages. Based on Nordhaus and Moffat (2017), we re-calibrate damages on
market-good consumption Dκ. The damage function for market goods becomes:
Dκ = κ T
2
t . (3.9)
To account for the 100 percent non-market damages on top of market damages,
we follow the approach of Sterner and Persson (2008) to calibrate the non-market cli-
mate damage parameter ψ by comparing two different model specifications:14 First, a
model in which non-market damages Dφ for a given temperature increase are perfectly
substitutable for damages on market goods and are included in consumption directly.
Second, a model in which damages are attributed to market goods Dκ and non-market
goods Dψ. The parameter ψ is calibrated as a residual, with C0 = E0 and E = 0 (see
Appendix B.1.2), and depends in particular on the non-market damage costs.
With the evolution of the non-market good (Equation 3.8) and the calibrated non-
market good climate damage coefficient ψ, the RPE in DICE is given by:15
RPEDICEt = (1− θ)
[
gct(δ, η, ...) +
2ψ T 2t gTt
(1 + ψ T 2t )
(
E0
E0 − E (1 + ψ T 2t )
)]
. (3.10)
Accordingly the RPE in DICE depends on three components: First the growth
rate of the market good gct , which is optimally determined by the Ramsey Rule in
DICE and thus depends on a number of key variables and parameters.16 It is in
14See Barrage (2016) for an alternative approach to calibrating non-market damages.
15The growth rate of non-market goods in continuous time is given by gEt =
E˙t
Et
= − 2ψTtT˙t
(1+ψT 2t )
. In
discrete time, we have gEt =
Et−Et−1
Et−1
= −ψ(T
2
t −T 2t−1)
(1+ψT 2t )
. With T 2t − T 2t−1 = T˙ 2t = 2TtT˙t = T 2t gTt this
is equivalent to the continuous time version.
16The growth rate of the market good is determined by gct =
[(
1
1+δ
)
(1 + YKt − ξ )
] 1
η −1, where ξ
is the proportional rate of capital depreciation and YKt is the marginal productivity of capital, which
depends on labor Lt, capital Ct, climate damages Dφ(Tt) and is in particular driven by total factor
productivity At =
At−1
1−gAt−1
. Total factor productivity At grows exogenously at a decreasing rate, with
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particular driven by the rate of technological progress as well as the distributional
parameters of the social welfare function: the rate of pure time preference, δ, and
the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption, η. Second, the RPE depends
on the growth rate of the non-market good gEt , which is a function of non-market
damages for a particular temperature increase, summarized in the damage parameter
ψ, and the growth rate of atmospheric temperature gTt , and is scaled by the size of the
subsistence requirement E. Finally, the difference in the two (weighted) good-specific
growth driver categories are scaled by the degree of substitutability θ between both
goods.
3.3 Relative prices and climate policy evaluation
3.3.1 The relative price effect and climate policy outcomes
In order to evaluate the impact of the relative price effect of non-market goods (RPE )
on optimal climate policy, we consider three measures: Yearly industrial emissions,
atmospheric temperature change above pre-industrial levels and the social cost of
carbon (SCC).17 Industrial emissions and atmospheric temperature change are climate
policy measures often refereed to in science and policy circles, while the SCC is widely
used by governmental bodies to inform carbon pricing.
We draw all parameter inputs from Nordhaus’s (2017) DICE-2016R, except for
those that concern the explicit introduction of the non-market good—the preference
share parameter α, the degree of substitutability θ as well as the magnitude of non-
market damages—which are based on Sterner and Persson (2008, abbreviated as S&P).
Table 3.1 provides an overview of the parameter specifications used in the S&P-RPE
case. Figure 3.1 depicts how the S&P-RPE evolves over time from the year of 2020
to 2100, and how it impacts industrial CO2 emissions, temperature change and the
SCC.18
gAt = g
A
0 e
−5tτA , where τA can be interpreted as the exogenous decline rate of technological progress.
17 In contrast to Nordhaus (2017), we compute the SCC without accounting for a backstop tech-
nology.
18The computations consider the full planning horizon of DICE. Appendix B.1.3 depicts the
overview figure for a longer time horizon, from 2020 to 2300. The numerical dynamic optimiza-
tion results presented in the following are calculated using the Knitro solver (version 10.2) together
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Figure 3.1: Relative price effect (RPE ) and comparison of climate policy paths. The green line
shows the Sterner and Persson (2008) case. The black line depicts the ‘Nordhaus’ comparison case
(with comparable and thus higher damages as in DICE-2016R). The dotted grey line features another
comparison case, yet with the lower rate of pure time preference, δ, of Stern.
Table 3.1: Parameter values for replicating Sterner and Persson (2008) in DICE-2016R
Parameter δ η MD** NMD*** α θ E
Baseline 1.5% 1.45 1.81% 1.81% 0.1 -1 0
Source* N N N S&P S&P S&P N, S&P
* N denotes values taken from Nordhaus (2017), while S&P denotes Sterner and Persson (2008).
** MD denote market damages under 3◦C warming, with κ = 0.0181.
*** NMD denote non-market damages under 3◦C warming, corresponding to ψ = 0.01604, which is
calibrated endogenously according to Equation A.9 .
The time path of the S&P-RPE depicted in the upper-left corner of Figure 3.1
shows that under optimal climate policy in DICE the S&P-RPE amounts to more
than 6 percent in 2020 and decreases over time to about 3 percent in 2100. As the
growth rate of non-market goods is negative but close to zero due to the optimal
management of climate change, this decrease in the S&P-RPE is primarily driven by
the declining growth rate of market consumption goods.
with the AMPL optimization software. The programming code is provided in Appendix B.1.4.
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Hence, although non-market goods become continuously scarcer in absolute terms until
peak temperature is reached (cf. Equation 3.8), and in relative terms as compared to
market goods throughout the planning horizon, the change in relative scarcity, as
measured by the relative price change, falls over time.
Moreover, Figure 3.1 compares this S&P-RPE to two cases that do not change
the DICE-2016R approach of (only implicitly) dealing with relative prices but that
differ in their assumptions about a key discounting parameter—the rate of pure time
preference, δ. First, we compare the S&P-RPE case to the optimal climate policy
trajectories in the ‘Nordhaus’ case.19 According to Sterner and Persson (2008), this
provides the direct comparison case to judge the impact of introducing relative prices.
To capture the findings of Sterner and Persson (2008) within the DICE-2016R model-
ing framework and to get an idea of how substantial the impact of the S&P-RPE is,
we also consider another case with Stern’s (2007) lower rate of pure time preference
of δ = 0.1 percent.
The lower-left panel of Figure 3.1 depicts the time path for industrial emissions,
which corresponds to the results figure in Sterner and Persson (2008, p. 70). In DICE-
2016R, and with the comparable assumption regarding non-market climate damages
based on Sterner and Persson (2008), emissions peak in 2035, while they did not peak
but continuously increased until 2100 in the older DICE version Sterner and Pers-
son (2008) refer to.20 When considering the S&P-RPE, industrial emissions decrease
immediately and become almost zero in 2055. Full decarbonization of the global econ-
omy is achieved as fast as when using the rate of pure time preference advocated by
Stern (2007). Yet, cumulative emissions are higher when considering the S&P-RPE
as compared to the optimization using Stern’s lower rate of pure time preference. The
upper-right panel of Figure 3.1 shows the development of atmospheric temperature
19Recall that climate damages are higher in the ‘Nordhaus’ run than in Nordhaus (2017) for
comparability with Sterner and Persson (2008).
20We follow Nordhaus (2017) in depicting industrial emissions in terms of CO2, not carbon. Note
that there are a number of changes between the DICE version that Sterner and Persson (2008) refer
to (DICE-2006) and the most recent version of DICE that we use (DICE-2016R), such as a lowering
of the rate of pure time preference and the inclusion of the possibility negative emissions. These
determine the difference of the dynamics of industrial emissions in Figure 3.1 to those depicted in
the key results figure in Sterner and Persson (2008, p. 70). With respect to pure time preference,
a higher δ for the basline S&P-RPE and for the ‘Nordhaus’ case would result in more emissions in
both runs. Also, as we will show in Section 3.4, a higher δ implies a lower S&P-RPE. Thus, that the
S&P-RPE and ‘Stern’ case emission paths is not due to the change in δ.
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change. We find that it stabilizes around 2.63◦C with the S&P-RPE but increases
until 3.44◦C in the ‘Nordhaus’ case. For comparison, using the rate of pure time
preference of 0.1 percent (‘Stern’) leads to a peak atmospheric temperature of 2.52◦C.
These emission and temperature developments translate into substantial differ-
ences between the time paths of the SCC (see the lower-right corner of Figure 3.1).
Comparing the S&P-RPE to the ‘Nordhaus’ case, we find that the SCC is 112 (365)
percent higher in 2020 (2100) in the S&P-RPE case. Comparing the ‘Nordhaus’ and
‘Stern’ runs, we find that the latter leads to an SCC that is 229 (159) percent higher
in 2020 (2100) as compared to the former. Overall, Figure 3.1 underscores the need
to distinguish between standard discounting and relative price changes as related but
distinct drivers of climate policy evaluation.
3.3.2 Stern or Sterner? Clarifying the influence of relative prices on the
stringency of climate policy
The discussion of Figure 3.1 naturally leads to the question how we can meaningfully
compare the stringency of climate policy across different optimization runs in order to
make statements such as ‘introducing relative prices yields an “even Sterner” review’
(Sterner and Persson 2008)? Such comparisons depend on how the following questions
are answered: First, what is the comparison metric? Second, what is the comparison
variable? Third, what is the baseline specification against which to compare the
influence of introducing relative prices?
First, Sterner and Persson (2008) base their finding of an an “even Sterner” report
on an examination of yearly carbon emissions. In their comparison within the 2006
DICE version, yearly emissions in the S&P-RPE simulation were initially in-between
the ‘Nordhaus’ and ‘Stern’ comparison cases, yet the S&P-RPE path of optimal emis-
sions led to an earlier decarbonization as compared to the ‘Stern’ case. In the most
recent DICE version (DICE-2016R) this is no longer the case: Initial emissions are still
in-between the ‘Nordhaus’ and ‘Stern’ comparison cases but the S&P-RPE path does
not lead to earlier decarbonization as compared to the ‘Stern’ case. Irrespective of
these differences due to changes in the DICE model over time, using yearly emissions
is not a clear-cut comparison metric because emission paths can potentially cross.
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With crossing of emission paths it may be that even if a model run leads to earlier de-
carbonization, it can entail higher cumulative emissions or a higher peak temperature.
Unambiguous comparison metrics would thus be peak atmospheric carbon concentra-
tion or peak temperature achieved under a given model parameterization. If we use
peak temperature change relative to pre-industrial levels as the comparison metric to
examine the relative impact of introducing the S&P-RPE with changes in the highly
disputed rate of pure time preference, we find the following: Considering relative prices
in the specification of Sterner and Persson (2008) is equivalent to reducing the pure
time preference from Nordhaus’s (2017) value of 1.5 percent by 1.2 percentage points,
i.e. a model run with a δ of 0.3 percent yields the same peak temperature as we ob-
tain when introducing the S&P-RPE. Although this shows that explicitly considering
relative prices does not yield ‘an even Sterner review’, as the reduction is lower than
1.4 percentage points, which would be comparable to using Stern’s rate of pure time
preference or a lower value, it still represents a very substantial influence on optimal
climate policy.
Second, what is the appropriate comparison variable? How meaningful is the
direct comparison of the S&P-RPE versus the ‘Nordhaus’ and ‘Stern’ cases given
that explicitly introducing relative prices entails a number of changes to the DICE
framework, which already implicitly contains relative prices? The cleanest comparison
between a model with relative prices and models that only differ in their rate of
pure time preference would be within a model that includes the RPE to a case with
perfect substitutability (θ = 1), as the RPE vanishes in this case (cf. Equations 3.5
and 3.10). We therefore now examine more closely the effect of changing the degree of
substitutability only, and compare its impact on optimal climate policy to the rate of
pure time preference, which is perhaps the most vividly discussed parameter in climate
economics. As climate policy comparison measure we use the peak temperature change
relative to 1750 that is reached in any given optimization run, as this yields a unique
maximum.
Figure 3.2 depicts the optimal atmospheric peak temperature obtained over the
whole planning horizon as a function of the rate of pure time preference, δ, for differ-
ent degrees of substitutability, θ. The bold black line shows the comparison case of
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Figure 3.2: The comparative influence of introducing relative prices on peak temperature.
The Figure depicts peak temperature as a function of the rate of pure time preference, δ, for different
degrees of substitutability, θ. The solid black line shows the comparison case of perfect substi-
tutability and thus without relative prices. The dashed green (black) line depicts the substitutability
assumption of Sterner and Persson with θ = −1 (‘Nordhaus’). A model run with relative prices can
then be compared to a run without them but with a higher δ such that peak temperature is the
same across both runs. For example, the implicit degree of limited substitutability contained in the
‘Nordhaus’ case is equivalent to a model without relative prices if we decrease δ by ∆δN1.5% = 0.78
percentage points.
perfect substitutability and thus without relative prices.21 In contrast, the dashed lines
depict runs with different degrees of limited substitutability and thus with RPEs. The
dashed green line shows the complementarity assumption of the S&P-RPE (θ = −1),
while the dashed black line depicts the ‘Nordhaus’ case with its implicit degree of
limited substitutability and relative prices. A model run with relative prices can now
be compared to a run without relative prices (θ = 1) but with a higher δ such that
the resulting optimal peak temperature is the same across both runs. This yields the
equivalent change in the pure rate of time preference, ∆δsupsub , of introducing relative
prices into climate policy evaluation, where the subscript denotes the baseline δ and
the superscript the degree of substitutability, θ, of the considered RPE. For example,
introducing relative prices with Cobb-Douglas substitutability (θ = 0) at a baseline
of δ = 1.5 is equivalent to decreasing δ by ∆δ01.5% = 0.6 percentage points in terms
21When market and non-market goods are perfect substitutes, optimal peak temperature reaches
2.9◦C (4.1◦C) for a rate of pure time preference of 0.1 (1.5) percent.
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of optimal peak temperature. This analysis reveals that the implicit degree of lim-
ited substitutability and thus of relative prices contained in the ‘Nordhaus’ case is
equivalent to a model without relative prices if we decrease δ by ∆δN1.5% = 0.78 per-
centage points.22 This also means that if substitution possibilities are, for example,
Cobb-Douglas, explicitly introducing an RPE into DICE would lead to less stringent
optimal climate policy as compared to the ‘Nordhaus’ case.
Figure 3.2 also allows us to re-examine whether introducing relative prices yields
an “even Sterner” review. Starting from the baseline value of pure time preference
of 1.5 percent and the complementarity assumption of Sterner and Persson (2008),
the lowest red subsidiary line shows the equivalent decrease in the rate of pure time
preference as we increase the degree of substitutability (from right to left). Comparing
the S&P-RPE to the ‘Nordhaus’ case reveals that an equivalent decrease in pure time
preference would amount to 1.20 percentage points. Thus, again, this comparison
would not yield an “even Sterner” report. Yet, as this subsidiary line does not intersect
the black line comparison case of perfect substitutability, we find that there is no
positive rate of pure time preference that would allow for an equivalent reduction in
peak temperature as introducing the S&P-RPE, that is ∆δ−11.5% = undefined. Already
a degree of substitutability of θ = -0.66 would be equivalent to reducing pure time
preference from the value employed by Nordhaus to that of Stern, that is ∆δ−0.661.5% = 1.4
percentage points. Introducing relative prices with the complementarity assumption of
Sterner and Persson (2008) may thus be considered as “even Sterner” than suggested
previously.
Third, we address the question of what is the appropriate baseline specification?
The analysis depicted in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 is based on the baseline specification of
the most recent DICE version from Nordhaus (2017), with the exception of higher
damages introduced to allow for a better conceptual comparability with Sterner and
Persson (2008). Yet, which baseline parameters we choose—for example regarding
the welfare parameters δ and η—matters for the effect sizes we obtain when making
comparison across model runs. If, for example, we use the higher (initial) rate of pure
22We find that the implicit degree of substitutability contained in the ‘Nordhaus’ case is non-
constant. We estimate the implicit θ for 2020 and 2100 to be −0.09 and −0.17, respectively. The
∆δ−0.131.5% = for the mean of these two degrees of substitutability would be 0.77 percentage points.
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time preference of 3 percent that was, for example, used in earlier DICE versions, we
would find that introducing relative prices with the complementarity assumption of
Sterner and Persson (2008) is equivalent in terms of peak temperature as reducing
the rate of pure time preference from 3 percent by ∆δ−13% = 2.5 percentage points.
Overall, it is therefore crucial to be specific about the baseline model specification.
This makes it particularly important to systematically examine how different potential
determinants affect the RPE and its influence on climate policy evaluation.
3.4 What drives the relative price effect (RPE)?
This section scrutinizes how the RPE depends on its main potential drivers. For this
sensitivity analysis, we consider two points in time: the year 2020 as the next ‘short-
run’ planning step as well as the year 2100 for a ‘longer-run’ picture. First, we consider
(i) the degree of substituatability between market and non-market goods. Next, we
consider (ii) the magnitude of non-market damages and (iii) the size of the subsistence
requirement for non-market goods. Finally, we analyze the main drivers of the growth
rate of human-made goods: (iv) the rate of pure time preference, (v) the elasticity of
the marginal utility of consumption and (vi) the rate of technological progress.
Substitutability
A key driver of the RPE is the degree of substitutability between market and non-
market goods. The upper panel of Figure 3.3 depicts the effects of varying the sub-
stitution parameter θ along a range of -2 to 1. This corresponds to a range of the
elasticity of substitution, σ, of one-third to infinity. The range encompasses all bench-
mark values assumed in the literature on relative prices and ecological discounting,
such as the Cobb-Douglas assumption of θ = 0 (Gollier 2012), as well as different
degrees of complementarity, e.g. θ = −0.333 (Kopp et al. 2012) and θ = −1 (Sterner
and Persson 2008). Furthermore, it includes indirect empirical estimates of substi-
tutability (Baumga¨rtner et al. 2015; Drupp 2016). These make use of the relationship
between the degree of substitutability and the income elasticity of willingness-to-pay
for public goods to estimate the elasticity of substitution from non-market valuation
studies. Drupp (2016) gathers indirect evidence on the substitutability parameter for
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Figure 3.3: Drivers of the relative price effect (RPE) of non-market goods (I).Top to bottom: sub-
stitutability, non-market damages and subsistence consumption—and their impact on the RPE in
2020 (left panel) and in in 2100 (right panel).
environmental goods from 18 non-market valuation studies and finds a mean estimate
[range] for the income elasticity of 0.43 [0.14, 0.72] and thus a substitutability param-
eter θ of 0.57 [0.28 to 0.86].23 Figure 3.3 confirms that the degree of substitutability is
an important driver of the RPE in both the ‘short-run’ (2020) and ‘longer-run’ (2100).
Assuming perfect substitutes eliminates the RPE, while the RPE in 2020 increases
to 6.20 percent for the baseline of θ = −1 (Sterner and Persson 2008), and to 8.10
percent for θ = −2. The respective values of the RPE in 2100 are 3.29 (4.74) percent
for θ = −1 (θ = −2) and the RPE reduces to 1.73 (0.77) percent for a value of θ of 0
(0.57).
23Since the composite non-market good in the DICE model also includes non-environmental goods,
such as relating to health, it is important to know whether these elasticities are also adequate for other
non-market goods. Within the health domain, there is a growing body of literature estimating income
elasticities of the value of a statistical life. These studies typically find mean income elasticities in the
range of 0.2 to 1 (Hammitt and Robinson 2011; Hoffmann et al. 2017; Viscusi and Masterman 2017),
thus corresponding closely to income elasticities obtained from environmental valuation studies.
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The magnitude of non-market damages
In our model the magnitude of non-market damages refers to the hypothetical mon-
etary damages from a climate change induced temperature increase to 3◦C on the
non-market good measured in percent of GDP. The baseline specification depicted in
Figure 3.1 assumes, following Sterner and Persson (2008), that non-market damages
account for an additional damage component that doubles overall climate damages.
This amounts to 1.63 percent of GDP under 3◦C warming. In contrast, Nordhaus
(2017) considers non-market damages as an additional damage component, amount-
ing to 0.49 percent of GDP under 3◦C warming. Since the climate damages share on
non-market goods is inherently uncertain, the only source of evidence we may draw
on are expert surveys. Nordhaus (1994) surveyed 19 experts on the economic im-
pacts of climate change. These experts forecast that 38 percent of damages should
be attributed to non-market goods (for a 3◦C warming until 2090). More recently,
Howard and Sylvain (2015) extended upon this study and surveyed a larger number
of experts on their “best guess of the percentage of total impacts (market plus non-
market) that will be borne by the market sector?”. The best guess of 213 respondents
is that 50 percent of damages accrue to non-market goods. This would be in line
with the doubling of market-damages as assumed by Sterner and Persson (2008). A
sizable standard deviation of 28 percent reveals substantial heterogeneity in responses.
Figure 3.3 therefore depicts the effect of non-market damages on the RPE for a large
range of non-market damages under 3◦C warming in the year 2020, spanning from 0 to
3 percent of GDP. In absolute terms the RPE remains almost flat at 6 percent, ranging
from 6.29 to 6.16 percent. In the year 2100 we find that the RPE ranges from 3.02 to
3.40. Thus, while the RPE falls slightly with higher non-market damages in 2020, it
increases with higher non-market damages in 2100. Why is it—perhaps surprisingly—
the case that the non-market damages scaling parameter has such a negligible effect
on the RPE? In Equation 3.10 the magnitude of non-market damages scales the effect
of temperature change to determine the growth rate of non-market goods.
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Due to the optimal management, the decline of the non-market good through tem-
perature change is dampened, such that the growth rate of the non-market good is
close to zero. As a consequence higher non-market damages only marginally change
the RPE.
Subsistence consumption
The subsistence requirement for the consumption of non-market goods refers to a
distinct amount that the representative agent is not willing to substitute by the con-
sumption of material goods. In our case the subsistence need basically reflects a
boundary for the atmospheric temperature, which is the only driving force of the
evolution of non-market goods. Figure 3.3 shows that the RPE is not sensitive to
changes in the stringency of the subsistence level E due to the optimal management
that ensures that the non-market good is provided at a level well above the subsistence
requirement. Specifically the RPE falls from 6.20 to only 6.15 percent when increasing
the subsistence level from 0 to 20 percent of the initial non-market good E0. When
increasing the stringency of the subsistence requirement, the difference between the
two good-specific growth rates declines and thus lowers the RPE.24 In the year 2100
we find qualitatively the same as for 2020: the RPE declines from 3.29 to 3.28 by
increasing the subsistence requirement.
Rate of pure time preference
The rate of pure time preference δ, measures how the utility of the representative
agent at different points should be weighted in relative terms. A positive rate implies
that the utility of future agents is discounted just because they live in the future.
There is considerable disagreement on what constitute plausible and justifiable values
for the rate of pure time preference. Figure 3.4 depicts the effects of the rate of pure
time preference on the RPE over an interval of 0 to 8 percent.25 This range is taken
from an expert survey on the determinants of the social discount rate by Drupp et al.
(2015). Not surprisingly the RPE in 2020 falls with the rate of pure time preference
from 7.17 percent for δ = 0 percent to 1.76 percent for δ = 8 percent per year.
24Additionally, E slightly impacts the RPE also indirectly via the calibration of the non-market
good climate damage coefficient ψ (Equation A.8), with ∂ψ/∂E ≤ 0 for θ ≤ 1.
25Note that for computational reasons we approximate 0 with 0.000001 percent.
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Figure 3.4: Drivers of the relative price effect (RPE) of non-market goods (II).The Figure depicts the
key determinants of the growth rate of consumption goods. Top to bottom: rate of pure time pref-
erence, elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption, and decline rate of total factor productivity
growth—and their impact on the RPE in 2020 (left panel) and in 2100 (right panel).
Nordhaus’s (2017) assumption of δ = 0.015 corresponds to a RPE of 6.20 percent. In
the year 2100, the rate of pure time preference has almost no effect on the RPE : the
corresponding RPE range is only 3.27 to 3.37 percent, i.e. the sensitivity is negligible
but qualitatively the influence of the rate of pure time preference on the RPE reverses.
Elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption
The elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption, η, is a measure of inequality
aversion with respect to the intertemporal distribution of inclusive consumption c˜.
Its range considered in Figure 3.4, from 0 to 5, includes all recommendations by
respondents to the expert survey by Drupp et al. (2015). It encompasses values used
in the prominent literature, such as unity (Stern 2007) and 1.45 as used in DICE
(Nordhaus 2017). We find that the RPE decreases with η over this range of parameter
values from 11.81 to 4.46 percent in 2020. In 2100, the RPE increases with η from
3.23 to 3.48 percent. The reversed pattern is thus the same as for the rate of pure
time preference, but overall the RPE is more sensitive to changes in the elasticity of
the marginal utility of consumption.
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Decline rate of total factor productivity
The growth rate of material consumption is in particular driven by total factor pro-
ductivity (TFP), At =
At−1
1−gAt−1
, which grows exogenously at a decreasing rate, with
gAt = g
A
0 e
−5tτA where τA can be interpreted as the decline rate of TFP. It represents
the key exogenous parameter determining the dynamics of productivity growth in
DICE. For our sensitivity analysis, we vary this parameter while we do not change the
shape of the time profile of technological progress imposed by Nordhaus (2017).26 We
find that the RPE in 2020 (2100) decreases from 6.28 (4.72) percent for τA = 0 per-
cent to 6.00 (1.02) percent for τA = 0.5 percent. The baseline case of Nordhaus (2017)
implies a decline rate of TFP growth of around 0.1 percent per year corresponding to
a RPE in 2020 (2100) of 6.20 (3.29) percent. A lower decline rate of TFP growth τA
makes non-market goods scarcer relative to human-made consumption goods as global
GDP is scaled up by higher exogenous growth in TFP. However, due to the logistic
shape of the dynamics of TFP, the effect on relative prices is more pronounced in
2100: Here the RPE decreases more than linearly in the decline rate of TPF growth
per year.
3.5 A plausible range for relative price changes and its influ-
ence on climate policy
Based on our systematic study of the individual determinants of the relative price
effect, this section examines what might be a plausible range and a best-guess central
calibration for each determinant of the RPE. To compare simulations and thus the
effect of the RPE on climate policy evaluation, we focus on peak temperature as the
comparison metric and make comparisons against the case of perfect substitutes.
In contrast to the analysis in Section 3.3, we specify a central calibration as a new
baseline and perform a Monte Carlo analysis with 1000 draws to construct plausible
ranges. For the lower and upper bounds, we consider a 95 percentile range around the
mean. We make the following assumptions regarding the distribution of the individual
determinants: For the degree of substitutability, we assume a Normal distribution
26Alternatively, one could vary the initial level gA0 or compute an average productivity measure
over the whole planning horizon. The latter would, however, imply to change the time profile of TFP
including higher initial growth rates, which thereby artificially increases the RPE in 2020.
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for which the values used in Sterner and Persson (2008), θ = −1, and the mean
empirical estimate from Drupp (2016), here taken as θ = 0.6, encompass the 95 percent
confidence interval, with a mean of θ = −0.2. For non-market damages, we draw
on the expert responses from the survey by Howard and Sylvain (2015) and assume
a Normal distribution with mean and standard deviation taken from their expert
data.27 For the subsistence requirement, we also consider a Normal distribution, with
an assumed mean value that amounts to 10 percent of the initial non-market good.
The 95 percent confidence interval is calculated such that it borders a zero subsistence
requirement. For δ and η we use the mean expert recommendations from the survey
of Drupp et al. (2015) for the central calibration. To construct plausible range we
randomly draw 1000 times from the sample of expert recommendations and use this
data for the 1000 Monte Carlo model runs. Finally, for the decline rate of TFP, τA, we
assume a Normal distribution with the mean given by the value of Nordhaus (2017).
The 95 percent confidence interval is calculated such that it is bounded from below
by a zero decline rate.
Overall, while some parameter values contained in the plausible ranges may seem
objectionable, they are chosen such that a non-negligible fraction of experts may advo-
cate employing them.28 Table 3.2 lists all the parameter choices for the optimization
of the plausible ranges and of the central calibration. Figure 3.5 depicts the central
calibration run (blue dashed line), the comparison run with perfect substitutability
and thus without an RPE (black dashed line), and the plausible range of the RPE
(blue-shaded area). Furthermore, it displays the impact of relative price changes on
climate policy outcomes for the time between year 2020 and 2100.
Figure 3.5 shows that the 95 percentil plausible range for relative price changes is
substantial: The RPE ranges between 9.6 and 1.3 percent in 2020 and between 3.6 to
0.8 percent in 2100. Peak atmospheric temperature ranges from 2.2◦C to 5.1◦C. The
SCC increase from 9 to around 76 US$ per ton of CO2 in the depicted time span at
the lower bound of the 95 percentile range, while it is far beyond commonly-assumed
27For non-market damages and for E and τA, we truncate the distribution to exclude negative
values.
28With respect to δ, for instance, more than 10 percent of experts in Drupp et al. (2015) rec-
ommended rates of 3 percent or higher. The 95 percent interval includes 6 percent as the highest
value.
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Figure 3.5: Relative price effect (RPE ) and comparison of climate policy paths for a best-guess
central calibration and a plausible range of the drivers of the RPE. The blue line represents the central
calibration of the RPE, while the black line depicts the perfect substitutability comparison (θ = 1)
in which the RPE vanishes. The blue-shaded area represents the 95 percentile range considering
uncertainty in all of the drivers of the RPE.
Table 3.2: Parameter specifications for the range and central calibration (CC) of the RPE
Parameter Source Distribution CC
θ S&P (2008), Drupp (2016) Normal;µ = −0.2, σ = 0.41 -0.2
NMD? Howard and Sylvain (2015) Normal;µ = 1.65%, σ = 4.15% 1.65%
E¯/E0 Assumption Normal;µ = 10%, σ = 5.10% 10%
δ Drupp et al. (2015) Raw expert data 1.10%
η Drupp et al. (2015) Raw experts data 1.35
τA Nordhaus (2017) Normal;µ = 0.1%, σ = 0.05% 0.1%
* NMD denotes non-market damages under 3◦C warming. NMD of 1.65% (4.15%) correspond to
a ψ of 0.0162414 (0.0419335).
prices of backstop technologies at the upper bound.29 In terms of industrial emissions,
the parameter ranges can lead to both full decarbonization in 2020 as well as to cases
in which it is optimal that emissions still increase until mid century.
For the central calibration, we find that the RPE decreases from 4.4 percent in 2020
to 2.0 percent in 2100. This leads to a full decarbonization in the year 2085 and a peak
29At the upper bound of the 95 percentile range the SCC is 2459 (10899) US$ per ton of CO2 in
2020 (2100). For better visibility we only show the range up to 600 US$ per ton of CO2.
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temperature of 3.2◦C. The SCC in 2020 is 77 US$ per ton of CO2 and increases up to
574 US$ per ton of CO2 in 2100. In contrast, in the perfect substitutability comparison
case without relative prices, decarbonization is only achieved in 2105. Compared to
the central calibration, neglecting relative prices would lead to an underestimation of
the SCC of 43 (68) percent in the year 2020 (2100). The peak temperature in the case
without the RPE is 3.7◦C, that is temperature peaks at 0.5◦C higher as compared to
our central calibration with relative prices. If we again translate this into an equivalent
change of the rate of pure time preference analogously to the analysis in Section 3.3.2,
we find that introducing relative prices with the degree of substitutability assumed
in our central calibration (θ = −0.2) is equivalent to reducing the rate of pure time
preference by 0.53 percentage points in a model without relative prices.
3.6 Discussion
In this section, we discuss to what extent assumptions made in this analysis limit
our results. In particular, we examine issues of (i) the growth of non-market goods,
(ii) technological progress, (iii) data availability on substitutability and non-market
damages, (iv) preference change, (v) behavioral influences as well as (vi) uncertainty.
First, we find that the drivers related to the growth of non-market goods are not of
quantitative importance for the RPE in the optimal management framework of DICE.
Yet, we assumed—following the previous literature—that the consumption of non-
market goods would stay constant in absence of climate change. Yet, non-market goods
could also decline in absence of climate change, for example resulting from biodiversity
loss due to other drivers. Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that environmental good
growth is not close to zero, as under optimal management in DICE, but of considerable
negative magnitude (Baumga¨rtner et al. 2015).30 Conversely, non-market goods may
also increase due to technical change that positively affects non-market goods, for
example relating to health improvements. Future studies could explore cases in which
non-market goods can grow or decline irrespective of the management problem at hand
30While much of the literature suggests that climate change leads to a loss of ecosystem services
(e.g. MEA 2005), this does not constitute a consensus (Mendelsohn et al. 2016). It is clear, however,
that climate change is not the only driver of biodiversity loss.
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as well as explicitly deal with the heterogeneity contained in the composite non-market
good. Introducing drivers of non-market goods growth that are unrelated to climate
change in a sense also relates to studying non-optimal climate policy, where we would
have imperfect management control. In such cases, drivers of non-market goods may
play a larger role for relative prices as in the optimal management considered here.
Second, the DICE model considers a specific kind of exogenous technological
progress. We have shown that it has a considerable impact on the RPE. It is thus cru-
cial to study technological progress in more detail, also considering the possibility of
endogenous technological progress (e.g. Hu¨bler et al. 2012, Popp 2004) as well as how
substitutability of environmental goods and natural capital interact with technological
progress (e.g. Bretschger 1998; Bretschger and Smulders 2012).
Third, the availability of reliable data on the magnitude of non-market damages
and the degree of substitutability of non-market goods represents a key challenge in
estimating relative price effects. There is only scarce empirical evidence on its potential
magnitude, which suggests substitutability at the margin (Drupp 2016) in contrast
to the mild complementarity relationship assumed in our central calibration. It is
therefore imperative to conduct more research to empirically estimate substitutability
of non-market goods so as to increase confidence about the likely magnitude of relative
prices.
Fourth, the DICE model, and our analysis, assumes that there are ‘deep preference’
parameters that do not change across generations, such as δ, η, θ and α. This common
assumption may not be appropriate. For example, a number of recent studies consider
time-varying rates of pure time preference (e.g. Gerlagh and Liski 2017; Millner 2017).
Fleurbaey and Zuber (2016) examine the impact of preference change in terms of
substitutability on dual discount rates. It could also be the case that preference
evolution, for example with respect to θ and α, is endogenous (Fenichel and Zhao 2015;
Krutilla 1967), or that there is simply heterogeneity in agent’s preferences within a
society at a given point in time, with the composition of agents changing over time.
There are thus ample possibilities to depart from this standard approach. As of yet,
it is not clear which extension would be the best to follow for analyses such as ours.
Fifth, we have abstracted from any behavioral effects related to relative price
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changes. Dietz and Venmans (2017) study the impact of the endowment effect on dual
discounting. Other possibilities may include extending the theory of relative prices to
studying relative consumption concerns (e.g. Johansson-Stenman and Sterner 2015).
Finally, the long term future is inherently uncertain. Yet, the DICE model is deter-
ministic. While a deterministic analysis such as ours can yield important insights, it
is clear that the analysis should be extended to cover different forms of uncertainty.31
For example, Jensen and Traeger (2014) analyze long term uncertainty about techno-
logical progress as the main driver of growth in the DICE model, Dietz et al. (2017)
study the combined effect of uncertainty about baseline growth as well as about the
payoff of a mitigation project in DICE, while Gollier (2010) analyzes uncertainty in
the growth rates of environmental and consumption goods and Gollier (2017) con-
siders uncertainty about the degree of substitutability. We find substitutability and
technological progress to be among the most important drivers of the RPE in DICE.
Hence, taking into account uncertainty about these drivers would be an important
next step.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the change in the relative price of non-
market goods by studying its quantitative magnitude, its fundamental drivers, and its
implications for climate policy in the integrated assessment of climate change. Our
analysis in the most recent version of the widely-used DICE model (Nordhaus 2017)
reveals that the relative price effect of non-market goods is substantial in quantitative
terms: it amounts to 4.4 (2.0) percent in the year 2020 (2100) in our central calibration.
When combining plausible ranges of all individual drivers the 95 percentile ranges
from a Monte Carlo analysis yield relative price effects that range from 9.6 to 1.3
percent in 2020 and from 3.6 to 0.8 percent in 2100. This highlights a considerable
degree of uncertainty concerning key drivers, in particular regarding the degree of
substitutability between market and non-market goods, the elasticity of the marginal
31See Heal and Millner (2014) for an overview of decision-making under uncertainty in the area
of climate change economics. Traeger (2014) adapts the 2007-DICE version such as to be able to
analyze effects of uncertainty quantitatively.
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utility of consumption, pure time preference as well as the development of technological
progress.
In terms of climate policy evaluation, we find that neglecting relative prices would
lead to an underestimation of the social cost of carbon of more than 40 (60) percent
in the year 2020 (2100) compared to our central calibration that considers relative
price effects. Furthermore, atmospheric temperature peaks at 0.5◦C lower when con-
sidering relative price effects. Introducing relative prices thus leads to recommending
more stringent climate policies and its influence on climate policy is of considerable
magnitude.
Our study furthermore clarifies how the influence of the relative price effect on
climate policy evaluation can be appropriately interpreted. We find that statements
such as ‘introducing relative prices leads to an “even Sterner review” are sensitive
to what we choose as comparison metric and variable as well as how we specify the
baseline. As an unambiguous comparison metric across different model runs, we use
peak temperature, exploiting the fact that each considered optimization run results in
a unique peak temperature in the 500 year time horizon that allows for comparability
across model runs. Introducing relative prices in the spirit of Sterner and Persson
(2008) in DICE-2016R, we find that this yields an equivalent reduction in the rate
of pure time preference of 1.2 percentage points when compared to the ‘Nordhaus’
run. Yet, since we show that the standard DICE model of Nordhaus (2017) already
contains a considerable relative price effect of non-market goods due to a kind of Cobb-
Douglas substitutability between (non-market) climate damages and production, this
value may underestimate the impact if introducing relative prices. Indeed, we show
that the cleanest comparison to establish the influence of relative prices on climate
policy evaluation is within a model that explicitly models them. This allows us to
only vary the degree of substitutability as compared to the case of perfect substitutes,
which lead relative prices to vanish, and then compute equivalent changes in the rate
of pure time preferences. This direct comparison reveals that there would be no
positive pure time preference that is equivalent to considering relative prices with the
complementary assumption of Sterner and Persson (2008). In our central calibration
that is informed by a systematic study of the determinants of the relative price effect
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and assumes higher substitutabilty as compared to Sterner and Persson (2008), we
show that considering relative prices is equivalent to decreasing the rate of pure time
preference by 0.53 percentage points. While we believe that relative price effects
should be modeled explicitly given their importance for climate policy evaluation, our
analysis reveals that the implicit degree of mild complementarity of non-market goods
already contained in the standard DICE model of Nordhaus (2017) comes close to our
central calibration and is therefore a rather plausible assumption. This also implies
that if market and non-market goods are considered substitutes, explicitly introducing
relative prices into DICE would lead to less stringent optimal climate policy.
While relative prices thus clearly matter considerably for climate policy evalua-
tion, our results likewise suggest an enduring importance of the two key ‘normative’
discounting parameters determining the intertemporal distribution of well-being. In-
deed, we find that in the short-run, the rate of pure time preference and the elasticity
of marginal utility of consumption indirectly influence the relative price effect quite
considerably, since the growth of consumption is endogenous in DICE.
Finally, our analysis provides guidance for the revision of discounting policy guide-
lines. Our findings suggests that the relative price effect of non-market goods is more
substantial than the one percent result presented in the literature for the relative price
effect of environmental goods that has informed policy guidance in the Netherlands
(Baumga¨rtner et al. 2015; Drupp 2016; Koetse et al. 2017). Our analysis also points
towards the most crucial determinants of relative prices, such as the degree of sub-
stitutability and technological progress. This suggests that it is imperative to obtain
better estimates for these drivers globally as well as at local or national levels to better
inform governmental guidance. All in all, our results support recent initiatives, such
as in the Netherlands, to consider relative price effects in project appraisal.
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B.1 Appendix to Chapter 3
B.1.1 Derivation of the relative price effect
To derive the relative price effect of non-market goods, RPEt =
d
dt
(
UE
Uc
)(
UE
Uc
)−1
(Equation 3.4), we first compute marginal utilities with respect to the two goods for
utility function (3.2):
UhEt = α(Et − E)θ−1
[
α(Et − E)θ + (1− α)cθt
] 1−θ
θ (A.1)
Uhct = (1− α)cθ−1t
[
α(Et − E)θ + (1− α)cθt
] 1−θ
θ . (A.2)
We thus have
UhEt
Uhct
=
α
(1− α)
(
Et − E
ct
)θ−1
(A.3)
The time derivative of this marginal rate of substitution is given by:
d
dt
(
UE
Uc
)
= (θ − 1) α
(1− α)
(
Et − E
ct
)θ−2 [
E˙t
ct
− (Et − E)c˙t
ct2
]
(A.4)
With the growth rates gi of the two goods i ∈ (E, c) defined as git = i˙tit , we can rewrite
this time derivative using i˙t = gitit as:
d
dt
(
UE
Uc
)
=
α
(1− α)
(
Et − E
ct
)θ−1
(θ − 1)
(
ct
Et − E
)[
gEtEt
ct
− (Et − E)gctct
ct2
]
= (1− θ) α
(1− α)
(
Et − E
ct
)θ−1 [
gct −
Et
Et − E
gEt
]
. (A.5)
The relative price effect of environmental goods is therefore given by
RPEt =
d
dt
(
UE
Uc
)
(
UE
Uc
) = (1− θ) [gct − Et
Et − E
gEt
]
. (A.6)
The relative price effect of non-market goods, i.e. the change in relative prices over
time, is thus the same as the difference in the two good-specific discount rates (see
Drupp 2016 for a derivation in continuous time).
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B.1.2 Calibration of non-market damages
The non-market good climate damage coefficient ψ is calibrated for a temperature
increase of T = 3◦C as follows:
W0
(
E0, (1−Dφ)C0, L0
)
= W0
(
(1−Dψ)E0, (1−Dκ)C0, L0
)
⇔ (A.7)
α
(
E0 − E
)θ
+ (1− α)
(
(1−Dφ)C0
)θ
= α
( E0
1 + ψT 2
− E
)θ
+ (1− α)
(
(1−Dκ)C0
)θ
We can solve this for the non-market climate damage parameter ψ as follows:
ψ =
E0
E + [ (E0 − E)θ + 1− α
α
((
(1−Dφ)C0
)θ
−
(
(1−Dκ)C0
)θ)] 1θ−1 − 1
T−2 .
(A.8)
Sterner and Persson (2008) assume that the initial amount of the non-market
good is equal to the starting value for material consumption as well as no subsistence
requirement in the consumption of the non-market good, i.e. C0 = E0 and E = 0. In
this case equation (A.8) reduces to
ψ =
1
T 2
[(
1− α
α
(1−Dφ)θ + 1− 1− α
α
(1−Dκ)θ
)−θ
− 1
]
. (A.9)
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B.1.3 Relative prices and comparison of climate policy paths until 2300
 0
 2
 4
 6
 8
 2020  2300
Relative price effect, % per year
Optimal RPE, S&P
 0
 1
 2
 3
 4
 2020  2300
Atmospheric temperature, °C change from 1750
RPE, S&P
Nordhaus
Stern
-20
 0
 20
 40
 2020  2300
Industrial emissions, gigatons CO2
RPE, S&P
Nordhaus
Stern
 0
 6000
 12000
 18000
 24000
 30000
 2020  2300
Social Cost of Carbon, US$ per ton CO2
RPE, S&P
Nordhaus
Stern
Figure 3.6: Relative price effect (RPE ) and comparison of climate policy paths for a time horizon up
to 2300. Otherwise, see description of Figure 1.
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B.1.4 AMPL programming code
# DICE 2016R with Relative Prices
# The additional code for the Monte Carlo Analysis in section 3.5
#can be requested from the authors.
# PARAMETERS
#Time horizon
param T default 100;
# Preferences
param eta default 1.45; #I-EMUC
param rho default 0.015; #time preference rate
# relative prices additions
param zeta default -1; #substitution parameter
param beta default 0.1; #share of environmental good in utility function
param EQbar default 0; #subsistence level of environmental good
param cbar default 0; #subsistence level of consumption per capita
# Discount factor
param R {t in 0..T} = 1*exp(-rho*5*t);
# Population and its dynamics
param L0:=7403; #initial world population 2015 (millions)
param gL0:=0.134; #growthrate to calibrate to 2050 pop projection
param L {t in 0..T}>=0;
let L[0]:=L0;
let {t in 1..T} L[t]:=L[t-1]*((11500/L[t-1])^gL0);
# Technology and its dynamics
param gamma:=0.3; #capital elasticity in production function
param deltaK:=0.1; #depreciation rate on capital (per year)
param Qgross0:=105.5; #Initial world gross output 2015 (trill 2010 USD)
param K0:=223; #initial capital value 2015 (trillions 2010 USD)
param A0:=5.115; #initial level of total factor productivity
param gA0 :=0.076; #initial growth rate for TFP per 5 years
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param deltaA default 0.005; #decline rate of TFP per 5 years
param gA {t in 0..T} := gA0*exp(-deltaA*5*t); # growth rate for TFP per period
param A {t in 0..T}>=0;
let A[0]:=A0;
let {t in 1..T} A[t]:=A[t-1]/(1-gA[t-1]);
# Emission parameters
param gsigma0:=-0.0152; #initial growth of sigma (coninuous per year )
param deltasigma:=-0.001; #decline rate of decarbonization per period
param ELand0:=2.6; #initial Carbon emissions from land 2015 (GtCO2 per period)
param deltaLand:=0.115; #decline rate of land emissions (per period)
param EInd0:=35.85; #Industrial emissions 2015 (GtCO2 per year)
param Ecum0:=400; #Initial cumulative emissions (GtCO2)
param mu0:=.03; #Initial emissions control rate for base year 2010
param Lambda0:=0; #Initial abatement costs
param sigma0:=EInd0/(Qgross0*(1-mu0));#initial sigma
#(kgCO2 per output 2005 USD in 2010)
param gsigma {t in 0..T};
let gsigma[0]:=gsigma0;
let {t in 1..T} gsigma[t]:=gsigma[t-1]*((1+deltasigma)^5);
param sigma {t in 0..T}>=0;
let sigma[0]:=sigma0;
let {t in 1..T} sigma[t]:=sigma[t-1]*exp(gsigma[t-1]*5);
param ELand {t in 0..T}>=0;
let ELand[0]:=ELand0;
let {t in 1..T} ELand[t]:=ELand [t-1]*(1-deltaLand);
# Carbon cycle
param MAT0=851; # Initial Concentration in atmosphere 2015 (GtC)
param MUP0:=460; # Initial Concentration in upper strata 2015 (GtC)
param MLO0:=1740; # Initial Concentration in lower strata 2015 (GtC)
param MATEQ:=588; # Equilibrium concentration in atmosphere
#(pre-industrial atmos. carbon) (GtC)
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param MUPEQ:=360; # Equilibrium concentration in upper strata (GtC)
param MLOEQ:=1720; # Equilibrium concentration in lower strata (GtC)
# Flow parameters
param phi12:=0.12;
param phi23:=0.007;
param phi11=1-phi12;
param phi21=phi12*MATEQ/MUPEQ;
param phi22=1-phi21-phi23;
param phi32=phi23*MUPEQ/MLOEQ;
param phi33=1-phi32;
# Climate model parameters
param nu:=3.1; # Equilibrium temperature impact (°C per doubling C02)
param Fex0:=0.5; # 2015 forcings of non-C02 GHG (Wm-2)
param Fex1:=1.0; # 2100 forcings of non-C02 GHG (Wm-2)
param TLO0:=0.0068; # Initial lower stratum temperature change (°C from 1900)
param TAT0:=0.85; # Initial atmospheric temp change (°C from 1900)
param xi1:=0.1005; # Speed of adjustment parameter for atmospheric temperature
param xi3:=0.088; # Coefficient of heat loss from atmosphere to oceans
param xi4:=0.025; # Coefficient of heat gain by deep oceans
param kappa:=3.6813; # Forcings of equilibrium CO2 doubling (Wm-2)
param xi2=kappa/nu; # climate model parameter
# external forcing (Wm-2)
#assumed to be constant and equal to Fex1 from 2100 onward,
#see e.g. Traeger (2014, Fig.1)
param Fex {t in 0..T}>=0;
let {t in 0..18} Fex[t]:=Fex0+1/18*(Fex1-Fex0)*(t);
let {t in 19..T} Fex[t]:=Fex1;
# Climate damage parameters
param Psi default 0.00181; # damage term without 25% adjustment;
damage quadratic term with 25% adjustment is 0.00236
param MD default 0.0163;
# market damages for 3°C warming above preindustrial according to Nordhaus (2017)
param TD default 0.0326;
# TD including 100% adjustment for NMD Stern (2007)=0.0326;
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#Nordhaus(2014) assumes 25% adjustment for NMD cooresponding to TD =0.02124,
#62.5%=0.0264857
param NMD:=TD-MD;
param TATlim default 12; # upper bound on atm. temperature change
# Abatement cost
param Theta:=2.6; # Exponent of control cost function
param pback0:=550; # Cost of backstop 2010 $ per tCO2 2015
param gback:=0.025; # Initial cost decline backstop cost per period
param pback {t in 0..T}>=0;
let pback[0]:=pback0;
let {t in 1..T} pback[t]:=pback[t-1]*(1-gback);
param phead {t in 0..T}=pback[t]*sigma[t]/Theta/1000;
# VARIABLES
# capital (trillions 2010 USD)
var K {t in 0..T}>=1;
# Gross output (trillions 2010 USD)
var Qgross {t in 0..T}=A[t]*((L[t]/1000)^(1-gamma))*(K[t]^gamma);
# carbon reservoir atmosphere (GtC)
var MAT {t in 0..T}>=10;
# carbon reservoir upper ocean (GtC)
var MUP {t in 0..T}>=100;
# carbon reservoir lower ocean (GtC)
var MLO {t in 0..T}>=1000;
# total radiative forcing (Wm-2)
var F {t in 0..T}=kappa*((log(MAT[t]/MATEQ))/log(2))+Fex[t];
# atmospheric temperature change (°C from 1750)
var TAT {t in 0..T}>=0, <=TATlim;
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# ocean temperature (°C from 1750)
var TLO {t in 0..T}>=-1, <=20;
# damage fraction
var Omega {t in 0..T}=Psi*(TAT[t])^2;
# damages (trillions 2010 USD)
var damage {t in 0..T}=Omega[t]*Qgross[t];
# emission control
var mu {t in 0..T}>=0;
# abatement costs (fraction of output)
var Lambda {t in 0..T}=Qgross[t]*phead[t]*(mu[t]^Theta);
# industrial emissions
var EInd {t in 0..T}=sigma[t]*Qgross[t]*(1-mu[t]);
# total emissions
var E {t in 0..T};
# maximum cumulative extraction fossil fuels (GtC)
var Ecum {t in 0..T}<=6000;
# Marginal cost of abatement (carbon price)
var cprice {t in 0..T}=pback[t]*mu[t]^(Theta-1);
# output net of damages and abatement(trillions 2010 USD)
var Q {t in 0..T}=(Qgross[t]*(1-Omega[t]))-Lambda[t];
# per capita consumption (1000s 2010 USD]
var c {t in 0..T} >= .1;
# aggregate consumption
var C {t in 0..T} = L[t]*c[t]/1000;
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# Investment(trillions 2005 USD)
var I {t in 0..T}>=0;
# Non-market good
var EQ {t in 0..T}>=0.0000001 <=1000;
# Non-market damages scaling parameter including subsistence requirement
# including sub
var a {t in 0..T} =(1/(nu^2))*(EQ[0]*(EQbar+((EQ[0]-EQbar)^(zeta)
+((1-beta)/beta)*(((1-TD)*C[0])^(zeta)-((1-MD)*C[0])^(zeta)))^(1/zeta))^(-1)-1);
var g_C {t in 0..T-1} = (C[t+1]-C[t])/C[t];
# growth rate of non-market goods
var g_EQ {t in 0..T-1} = ((EQ[t+1]-EQ[t])/EQ[t]);
# relative price effect
var RPE {t in 0..T-1} =(1-zeta)*(g_C[t]-((EQ[t]/(EQ[t]-EQbar))*g_EQ[t]));
# utility
var U {t in 0..T}= (((1-beta)*(c[t])^(zeta)+
beta*((EQ[t]-EQbar)*1000/L[t])^(zeta))^((1-eta)/zeta))/(1-eta);
# welfare/objective function
var W=sum{t in 0..T} L[t]*U[t]*R[t];
maximize objective_function: W;
subject to initial_consumption: c[0]=10.4893;
subject to constr_accounting {t in 0..T}:
C[t]=Q[t]-I[t];
subject to constr_emissions {t in 0..T}:
E[t]=EInd[t]+ELand[t];
subject to constr_capital_dynamics {t in 1..T}:
K[t]=(1-deltaK)^5*K[t-1]+5*I[t-1];
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subject to constr_cumulativeemissions {t in 1..T}:
Ecum[t]=Ecum[t-1]+(EInd[t-1]*5/3.666);
subject to constr_atmosphere {t in 1..T}:
MAT[t]=E[t]*(5/3.666)+phi11*MAT[t-1]+phi21*MUP[t-1];
subject to constr_upper_ocean {t in 1..T}:
MUP[t]=phi12*MAT[t-1]+phi22*MUP[t-1]+phi32*MLO[t-1];
subject to constr_lower_ocean {t in 1..T}:
MLO[t]=phi23*MUP[t-1]+phi33*MLO[t-1];
subject to constr_atmospheric_temp {t in 1..T}:
TAT[t]=TAT[t-1]+xi1*((F[t]-xi2*TAT[t-1])-(xi3*(TAT[t-1]-TLO[t-1])));
subject to constr_ocean_temp {t in 1..T}:
TLO[t]=TLO[t-1]+xi4*(TAT[t-1]-TLO[t-1]);
# Initial conditions
subject to initial_capital: K[0] = K0;
subject to initial_Ecum: Ecum[0]=Ecum0;
subject to initial_MAT: MAT[0]=MAT0;
subject to initial_MUP: MUP[0]=MUP0;
subject to initial_MLO: MLO[0]=MLO0;
subject to initial_TLO: TLO[0]=TLO0;
subject to initial_TAT: TAT[0]=TAT0;
subject to initial_control: mu[0]=mu0;
subject to control1 {t in 1..28}: mu[t]<=1;
subject to control2 {t in 29..T}: mu[t]<=1.2; # from 2150
subject to initial_EQ: EQ[0]=C[0];
subject to constr_EQ {t in 1..T}: EQ[t]=(EQ[0]/(1+a[t]*(TAT[t]^2)));
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4 Interacting Externalities of Ocean Acidification,
Global Warming and Eutrophication
General Equilibrium Analysis for a Developing Country
This chapter has not been published yet. It may be referenced as:
M.C. Ha¨nsel (2017). Interacting Externalities of Ocean Acidification, Global
Warming and Eutrophication: General Equilibrium Analysis for a Developing
Country. Mimeo, University of Kiel.∗
Abstract: We describe an economy dependent on agriculture and fisheries to study
optimal environmental policy in the face of interacting external effects of ocean acidi-
fication, global warming and eutrophication. The model captures that CO2 emissions
not only contribute to global warming through an increase of the atmospheric tem-
perature but also cause ocean acidification. Global warming affects both sectors while
ocean acidification influences fisheries. The model accounts for agriculture run-off of
pesticides and fertilizers, which results in eutrophication of the ocean that negatively
affects the productivity of fisheries. The utility of a representative consumer reflects
both use and non-use values of agricultural and fishery resources by incorporating
not only the consumption of their products but also a biodiversity value. The lat-
ter decreases in the three environmental damages. We derive optimal rules for taxes
on CO2 emissions and agricultural run-off and show how they depend on both iso-
lated and interacting damage effects. In addition, we derive a second-best rule for a
tax on agricultural run-off of pesticides and fertilizers for the realistic case that an
effective internalization of CO2 externalities is lacking. The results contribute to an
understanding of the economics of ocean acidification interacting with other important
environmental stressors for economies particularly sensitive to such stressors.
Keywords: ocean acidification, global warming, eutrophication, climate policy, gen-
eral equilibrium
∗Acknowledgments: I am very grateful to Jeroen van den Bergh and Martin Quaas for their
support.
4.1 Introduction
Climate change is a major challenge for humankind and has been termed the “great-
est market failure the world has ever seen” (Stern 2007, p. viii). Consequently, the
economic implications of it have been studied extensively over the last decades. In
contrast, the economics of ocean acidification, a phenomenon caused by uptake of
atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) in the oceans, is still a rather underdeveloped re-
search area. Nevertheless, the socioeconomic consequences of ocean acidification are
expected to be considerable. Under a business as usual emission path, ocean acidi-
fication is likely to affect ecosystem services provided by the oceans, such as ocean
carbon uptake, coastal protection, food security, tourism, human health and biodiver-
sity (Turley and Gattuso 2012, Hilmi et al. 2012, Gattuso et al. 2015, Rodrigues et al.
2015).
While the largest emitters of greenhouse gas emissions are developed economies,
developing economies will likely be hit the hardest by climate change. The same is
true for ocean acidification: The highest risk of possible impacts is projected to occur
in developing coastal economies (Cooley et al. 2012), such as Senegal and Madagascar,
as they depend on fishery resources for nutrition and as a main source of income. In
order to evaluate socioeconomic effects of ocean acidification and design appropriate
policy instruments it is constructive to analyze ocean acidification within a broader
context of global environmental and ecosystem change (Riebesell and Gattuso 2015,
Turley and Gattuso 2012). Moreover, ocean acidification is often regionally intensified
by regional sources of acidification, most importantly through eutrophication caused
by nutrient run-off from acidic fertilizers used in agricultural production (Kelly et al.
2011).
Based on these stylized facts of ocean acidification research, this paper describes
an economy that is representative of many sea-bordering developing countries, namely
highly dependent on agriculture and fisheries and suffers from three negative external-
ities: Global warming, ocean acidification and nutrient run-off of acidic fertilizers used
in agricultural production. We design a general equilibrium model to study the in-
teraction of the three negative externalities and appropriate optimal policy responses.
For the realistic case of an optimal carbon tax that internalizes the negative effects
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of global warming and ocean acidification can not be implemented, we also derive a
second-best optimal tax on nutrient run-off and compare it to the first-best case.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 describes the
overall structure and feedback loops in the modeled economy-environment system,
while it reviews relevant notions and insights from other studies. Section 4.3 presents
the general equilibrium model and derives first- and second-best policy rules. Section
4.5 summarizes the results and concludes.
4.2 Framework and related literature
The following figure sketches the structure and feedback loops in the economy-environment
system we analyze in this paper.
Figure 4.1: Structure and feedback loops in the economy-environment system, while“+” and “-”
reflect the sign of the feedback: Agriculture (A) and fisheries (F) interact with consumers (C) and
the natural environment; the latter determines the status of biodiversity (B) and is affected by
the mean global temperature increase (T), ocean acidification (O), nutrient run-off (N) and their
interaction (I).
The model structure reflects the economic setting of a coastal developing economy
with two producing sectors: Agriculture (A) and fisheries (F). Consumers (C) depend
on agricultural and fishery products for nutrition and can thus be expected to be
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highly exposed to risks from shortages in food supply (Cooley et al. 2012). Consumers
and both sectors interact with their natural environment determining the status of
biodiversity (B) that has a positive influence on the well-being of consumers in the
economy. The status of biodiversity is represented by the biggest rectangle in figure
4.1 and is modelled to be negatively affected by three environmental stressors: The
mean global temperature increase (T), ocean acidification (O), nutrient run-off (N)
from agricultural production and their interaction (I).
We assume that agricultural and fishery production is fossil fuel intensive1 and
hence, contributes to global warming. Mostly as a result of fossil fuel emissions and
land use changes global mean atmospheric CO2 levels have increased by 42% from
about 280 ppm in pre-industrial levels to 405 ppm in the beginning of 2017 (IPCC
2013, NOAA 2017) resulting in two important global transformations. Relatively
well known is the mean global surface temperature increase. According to the World
Meteorological Organization 2016 was the hottest year on record with 1.1◦C above
pre-industrial levels. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the far-reaching
consequences of global warming in detail. For the current analysis it is relevant to
note that agricultural and fishery production not only contribute to global warming
by using fossil fuel intensive production inputs, but also suffer from it.
The relationship between crop yields in agriculture and climatic variables is well
studied in both developed and developing countries (Mendelsohn et al. 1994, Schlenker
et al. 2006, Descheˆnes and Greenstone 2007, Schlenker and Roberts 2009, Welch et al.
2010, Chen et al. 2016, Burke and Emerick 2016). Simulation models suggest that even
moderate global warming could have negative effects on wheat, maize and rice produc-
tion of subsistence farmers like those operating in many coastal economies (Morton
2007).
1 We assume that fossil fuels are needed to run tractors and fishing boats.
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Studies that estimate the effect of ocean warming on global fisheries predict spatial
redistribution effects of fisheries catch potential (Cheung et al. 2010, Blanchard et al.
2012), higher vulnerability of coastal fisheries to climate change (Allison et al. 2009)
and changes in catch composition (Cheung et al. 2013). Socioeconomic consequences
are expected in particular for coastal fishing communities, which are a central element
of the analysis in this paper.
Besides global warming, there is ‘the other’, less well-known, problem associated
with the increasing stock of atmospheric CO2, namely ocean acidification (O). In our
model both the agricultural and the fishery sector positively contribute to ocean acid-
ification, but only the fishery sector, which depends on ocean resources, is negatively
affected by it. Between 1750 and 2011 the world’s oceans have absorbed about 30%
of atmospheric CO2 (IPCC 2013), which basically leads to two important chemical
reactions: First, dissolved CO2 reacts with seawater and forms carbonic acid, causing
hydrogen ion concentrations to increase and hence pH to fall. With high confidence
CO2 uptake has caused ocean surface pH to fall by 0.1 below the preindustrial aver-
age, which translates into a 26% increase in acidity (IPCC 2013). Under business as
usual (IPCC AR5, RCP 8.52) ocean surface pH is projected to fall by 0.42 units below
pre-industrial levels by 2100 (Bopp et al. 2013). Second, CO2 reacts with seawater
and carbonate leading to a decrease in carbonate ions, which increases the dissolu-
tion rate of calcium carbonate. Main mineral forms of calcium carbonate, such as
calcite and aragonite, that are used by many marine organisms to build their shells
and skeletons, start dissolving at low carbonate ion concentrations (Orr et al. 2003,
Turley 2013). Hence, ocean acidification could lead to important negative effects on
the growth of calcifying organisms (Kroeker et al. 2010) implying negative ecological
and economic impacts (Cooley and Doney 2009, Gattuso et al. 2014). Direct impacts
on fisheries markets may occur because commercially important global bivalve popula-
tions could decline (Cooley and Doney 2009, Talmage and Gobler 2010). In addition,
non-market impacts are possible due to restructuring of ecosystems, biodiversity loss
and degradation of coral reefs (Hilmi et al. 2012, Gattuso et al. 2015, Rodrigues et al.
2015).
2 Representative Concentration Pathway 8.5.
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The existing literature on the economic impacts of - and appropriate policy re-
sponses to - global warming and ocean acidification mainly studies either effect in
isolation from one another and from other potential environmental stressors. How-
ever, it will be key to understand ocean acidification within a more comprehensive
ecosystem response to environmental change (Riebesell and Gattuso 2015, Turley and
Gattuso 2012). Oftentimes, the effects of global warming and ocean acidification are
regionally intensified by specific local sources of acidification like sulfur dioxide pre-
cipitation or eutrophication through run-off from acidic fertilizers (Kelly et al. 2011).
As a consequence, a regional strategy to counteract ocean acidification would have
to be designed in a way that integrates impacts from ocean acidification with other
global ocean stressors, such as overfishing, habitat destruction, temperature change
and non-acidifying pollution, and with specific regional stressors like eutrophication
(Kelly et al. 2011). In this paper we build on this by designing an economic setting,
which integrates ocean acidification with global warming as a key global environmental
stressor as well as with nutrient run-off (N) from acidic fertilizers used in agricultural
production as a key regional environmental stressor.
Human inputs of nutrients such as nitrogen and phosphorus, which are used in
agricultural fertilization in order to increase food output, can result in excessive pro-
duction of algae. This process, known as eutrophication, changes the structure and
functioning of global ecosystems and its services provided to humans (Compton et al.
2011, Rockstrom et al. 2009, Diaz and Rosenberg 2008). The microbial decomposition
of the large phytoplancton biomass originating from algae booms not only results in
low oxigen concentrations (hypoxia), which can displace or kill fish and invertebrates
populations. At the same time this process releases CO2, which lowers the pH and
increases the acidity of subsurface waters in coastal regions (Cai et al. 2011). In some
regions coastal eutrophication contributes more to coastal water acidity than global
ocean acidification (Kelly et al. 2011). In addition euthrophication may reduce the
ability of coastal waters to buffer changes in pH, such that the interaction of global and
coastal ocean acidification is more than the sum of both effects (Cai et al. 2011). In our
model we account for this by including an interaction effect (I) between temperature,
ocean acidification and nutrient run-off. While the agricultural sector only suffers from
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temperature damages, fisheries are negatively affected by all three modelled negative
externalities and their interaction.
We utilize the model structure in figure 4.1 to find optimal policy responses to (i)
the negative effects of carbon in the atmosphere (global warming and ocean acidifica-
tion) and (ii) nutrient run-off in general equilibrium. Although an effective internaliza-
tion of CO2 externalities based on an optimal carbon tax should be the ultimate target
to fight both global warming and ocean acidification, this is far from being realistic.
It has been argued that the missing political willingness to support a global solution
can be a reason to focus more on regional management (Rau et al. 2012). Existing
global effort will not be enough to prevent marine ecosystems from serious changes and
hence, regional tailor-made mitigation strategies particularly targeting those, which
are most affected (e.g.small developing coastal communities), should receive more at-
tention (Rau et al. 2012, Strong et al. 2014). In this light, we not only calculate the
first-best optimal taxes on carbon and nutrient run-off, but also derive the second-best
optimal tax on nutrient run-off for the case that an effective internalization of CO2
externalites is lacking.
4.3 General equilibrium model and policy rules
We introduce a static general equilibrium model of a closed coastal economy with agri-
culture (A) and fisheries (F ) as production sectors, which generate three externalities.
CO2 emissions contribute to global warming, captured in the model by an increase
of atmospheric temperature (T ) relative to the pre-industrial level. CO2 emissions
further cause ocean acidification (O). A third externality is due to agriculture run-off
of pesticides and fertilizers which cause eutrophication (N for nutrient run-off) of the
ocean. We assume that agricultural output is only affected by global warming. On
the other hand the fisheries sector suffers from all three externalities, due to global
warming, ocean acidification and eutrophication. Moreover, we include an interaction
term (I) to reflect that the three effects may be synergetic in terms of the overall
damage.
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The two sectors produce output Qi (with i = A,F ) by means of emissions and
labor.3 We assume that variable inputs like fertilizers or fuels are highly correlated
with capital use, such as tractors or fishing boats. Thus, while capital utilization is
carbon (M) emission intensive, with eAM and e
F
M denoting carbon emissions in the
agriculture and fishery sector, emissions from eutrophication eAN can be thought of to
be a byproduct of capital utilization in the agriculture sector.
Net output in the agricultural sector QA increases in labor lA, agricultural carbon
emissions eAM and emissions from nutrient run-off e
A
N . Q
A decreases in the global mean
atmospheric temperature increase T , which determines temperature damages.
QA = fA
(
lA, eAM , e
A
N , T
)
(4.1)
Additionally we assume that fA is strictly concave in carbon emissions, i.e. that
∂2fA
∂eAM∂e
A
M
< 0 and that the second cross derivative is positive, i.e. ∂
2fA
∂eAM∂e
A
N
> 0. The
former means that carbon emissions become less productive the more carbon emissions
are needed for production. The latter captures that carbon emissions and nutrient
run-off are modeled as complements, reflecting that carbon-intensive fuels and acidic
fertilizers are jointly used in agricultural production.4
Net output in the fishery sector QF increases in labor lF and carbon emissions eFM and
decreases in the global mean temperature anomaly T , ocean acidification O, nutrient
run-offN and in an interaction effect I determined by all three environmental stressors.
QF = fF
(
lF , eFM , T, O,N, I
)
(4.2)
In terms of factors of production, we assume an inelastic factor supply. Total carbon
emissions EM are the sum of carbon emissions from both sectors of the economy and
carbon emissions from the rest of the world eRM . Total emissions from nutrient run-off
EN are the sum of nutrient emissions from agricultural production and nutrient run-off
from the rest of the world eRM .
3In line with the literature on optimal pollution regulation (e.g Muller and Mendelsohn (2009))
we treat emissions directly as a factor of production.
4The cross derivative is negative when the production factors are substitutes. See Hoel (2012) for
an example of energy production from fossil fuels and renewables.
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L = lA + lF (4.3)
EM = e
A
M + e
F
M + e
R
M (4.4)
EN = e
A
N + e
R
N (4.5)
We focus on a representative consumer, who derives utility from the consumption of
agricultural and fish products CA and CF as well as from a public good B representing
the status of biodiversity. The inclusion of biodiversity in the utility function reflects
that there are not only direct use values of land and ocean based ecosystems but also
non-use values. Utility increases in B while we model B to be negatively affected by
the three environmental stressors and their interaction. The resulting utility function
reads:
U
(
cA, cF , B
(
T,O,N, I
))
(4.6)
Finally, the output in both sectors of the economy is consumed entirely.
Qi = ci with i = A,F (4.7)
Both the global mean atmospheric temperature increase T and ocean acidification O
increase in the total amount of carbon emissions EM .
T = T (EM) with T
′ > 0 (4.8)
O = O(EM) with O
′ > 0 (4.9)
Nutrient run-off N increases in the total amount of emissions from nutrient run-off
EN .
N = N(EN) with N
′ > 0 (4.10)
The interaction effect I increases in both total carbon emissions and total emissions
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from nutrient run-off.
I = I(EM , EN) with
∂I
∂EM
> 0 and
∂I
∂EN
> 0 (4.11)
4.3.1 Market solution
The representative consumer maximizes utility subject to a budget constraint, where
w is the wage, pF is the price of the final food produced in the fishery sector, while
we set the price of the agricultural good to unity, i.e. pA = 1 (numeraire).
max
{cA,cF }
U(cA, cF , B) subject to wL ≥ cA + pF cF (4.12)
In the optimum the marginal rate of substitution between consumption of agricultural
products cA and fish consumption cF is equal to the price ratio of the two products,
i.e.:
∂U/∂cA
∂U/∂cF
=
1
pF
(4.13)
In each sector he representative firms maximizes profits subject to the production
technology. Production costs include the payment of taxes τM on carbon emissions
and τN on nutrient run-off.
5
max
{lA,eAM ,eAN}
{
fA
(
lA, eAM , e
A
N , T )
)
− wlA − τMeAM − τNeAN
}
(4.14)
max
{lF ,eFM}
{
pFfF
(
lF , eFM , T, O,N, I)
)
− wlF − τMeFM
}
(4.15)
5We abstain here from complicating issues like non-point sources of pollution and assume a single
tax, e.g. on fertilizers, is effective. Section 4.4 discusses some aspects of non-point source pollution
in relation to our study.
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The first order conditions for both sectors are then:
∂fA
∂lA
= w (4.16)
∂fA
∂eAM
= τM (4.17)
∂fA
∂eAN
= τN (4.18)
pF∂fF
∂lF
= w (4.19)
pF∂fF
∂eFM
= τM (4.20)
We can equate (4.16) with (4.19) and (4.17) with (4.20) to arrive at the following two
conditions:
∂fA
∂lA
=
pF∂fF
∂lF
(4.21)
∂fA
∂eAM
=
pF∂fF
∂eFM
(4.22)
Equations (4.21) and (4.22) require that in equilibrium both the value of the marginal
product of labor and the value of the marginal product of carbon emissions must be
the same in the two sectors. The value of the marginal product of carbon emissions
can also be interpreted as the cost the representative firm has to bear when abating
one unit of carbon emissions. Hence, (4.22) can be interpreted as one of the fundamen-
tal insights of environmental economics: In the equilibrium with pollution taxation
marginal abatement cost must be equal across sectors. This result is due here to a uni-
form carbon tax, regardless of its specific value. From the first order conditions (4.17)
and (4.20) we know that the optimal carbon tax must be exactly equal to the marginal
abatement cost of carbon emissions. Similarly, (4.18) requires that the optimal tax on
nutrient run-off from agricultural production equates to the marginal abatement cost
of nutrient emissions.
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Finally we can combine equation (4.13) with equations (4.21) and (4.22):
∂U
∂cA
∂U
∂cF
=
∂fF
∂lF
∂fA
∂lA
=
∂fF
∂eFM
∂fA
∂eAM
(4.23)
This means that the marginal rate of substitution between agricultural product con-
sumption and fish consumption must equal the marginal rate of technical substitution
between labor in the two sectors, which must again be equal to the marginal rate
of technical substitution between carbon emissions used in production in each of the
sectors.
4.3.2 Socially optimal allocation
A central planner maximizes social welfare, that is, the utility of a representative
agent, while taking into consideration the entire feedback structure in the economy.
In particular, the optimization program reads:
max
{cA,cF ,lA,lF ,eAM ,eFM ,eAN}
U
(
cA, cF , B
(
T,O,N, I
))
subject to equations
(4.1), (4.2), (4.3), (4.4), (4.5), (4.7), (4.8), (4.9), (4.10), (4.11) (4.24)
By substituting all the constraints into the objective function, the following maximiza-
tion problem results:
max
{lA,eAM ,eFM ,eAN}
U
(
fA
(
lA, eAM , e
A
N , T (EM)
)
,
fF
(
L− lA, eFM , T (EM), O(EM), N(EN), I(EM , EN)
)
,
B
(
T (EM), O(EM), N(EN), I(EM , EN)
)) (4.25)
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The first order conditions6 describing the socially optimal allocation are:
∂U
∂eAM
= 0 ⇔ ∂U
∂cA
[
∂fA
∂eAM
+
∂fA
∂T
T ′
]
+
∂U
∂cF
[
∂fF
∂T
T ′ +
∂fF
∂O
O′ +
∂fF
∂I
∂I
∂eAM
]
+
∂U
∂B
[
∂B
∂T
T ′ +
∂B
∂O
O′ +
∂B
∂I
∂I
∂eAM
]
= 0 (4.26a)
∂U
∂eFM
= 0 ⇔ ∂U
∂cA
[
∂fA
∂T
T ′
]
+
∂U
∂cF
[
∂fF
∂eFM
+
∂fF
∂T
T ′ +
∂fF
∂O
O′ +
∂fF
∂I
∂I
∂eFM
]
+
∂U
∂B
[
∂B
∂T
T ′ +
∂B
∂O
O′ +
∂B
∂I
∂I
∂eFM
]
= 0 (4.26b)
∂U
∂eAN
= 0 ⇔ ∂U
∂cA
∂fA
∂eAN
+
∂U
∂cF
[
∂fF
∂N
N ′ +
∂fF
∂I
∂I
∂eAN
]
+
∂U
∂B
[
∂B
∂N
N ′ +
∂B
∂I
∂I
∂eAN
]
= 0 (4.26c)
∂U
∂lA
= 0 ⇔ ∂U
∂cA
∂fA
∂lA
− ∂U
∂cF
∂fF
∂lF
= 0 (4.26d)
From (4.26d) we obtain the well known condition for the socially optimal allocation
in the private good markets, which is identical to (4.23).
∂U
∂cA
∂U
∂cF
=
∂fF
∂lF
∂fA
∂lA
(4.27)
The marginal rate of substitution between agricultural product consumption and fish
consumption must equal the marginal rate of technical substitution between labor in
the two markets.
6Note that ∂T
∂eAM
= ∂T
∂eFM
= T ′, ∂O
∂eAM
= ∂O
∂eFM
= O′, ∂N
∂eAN
= N ′.
112
We rearrange (4.26a) and use (4.17) to obtain the optimal tax on carbon emissions τ ∗M ,
which is equal to the Pigouvian carbon tax τ̂M
∗ capturing the marginal social damage
from carbon emissions.7
τ ∗M = τ̂M
∗ =
[ MD Biodiversity︷ ︸︸ ︷
−∂U
∂B
(
∂B
∂T
T ′ +
∂B
∂O
O′ +
∂B
∂I
∂I
∂eAM
) MD Own-Sector︷ ︸︸ ︷
− ∂U
∂cA
∂fA
∂T
T ′
MD Other-Sector︷ ︸︸ ︷
− ∂U
∂cF
(
∂fF
∂T
T ′ +
∂fF
∂O
O′ +
∂fF
∂I
∂I
∂eAM
)]
1
∂U
∂cA
=
[ MD Temperature︷ ︸︸ ︷(
−∂U
∂B
∂B
∂T
− ∂U
∂cA
∂fA
∂T
− ∂U
∂cF
∂fF
∂T
)
T ′+
MD Ocean Acidification︷ ︸︸ ︷(
−∂U
∂B
∂B
∂O
− ∂U
∂cF
∂fF
∂O
)
O′
+
MD Interaction︷ ︸︸ ︷(
−∂U
∂B
∂B
∂I
− ∂U
∂cF
∂fF
∂I
)
∂I
∂eAM
]
1
∂U
∂cA
(4.28)
Equation (4.28) shows two decompositions, allowing two interpretations of the op-
timal tax. According to the first decomposition the optimal carbon tax is the sum
of marginal damages (MD) from temperature increase, ocean acidification, nutrient
run-off and the interaction term measured in terms of consumption of the (own) agri-
cultural sector. The second decomposition illustrates that the optimal tax includes
marginal damages on the biodiversity value as well as marginal damages on production
in the own agricultural sector (own-sector effect) and the fishery sector (other-sector
effect).
7Note that the Pigouvian tax must not always be equal to the optimal tax, see for example Cremer
et al. (1998).
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In order to calculate the optimal tax on nutrient run-off τ ∗N , we use (4.18) and rearrange
(4.26c).
τ ∗N = τ̂N
∗ =
[ MD Biodiversity︷ ︸︸ ︷
−∂U
∂B
(
∂B
∂N
N ′ +
∂B
∂I
∂I
∂eAN
)
−
MD Other-Sector︷ ︸︸ ︷
∂U
∂cF
(
∂fF
∂N
N ′ +
∂fF
∂I
∂I
∂eAN
)]
1
∂U
∂cA
=
[ MD Nutrient-Runoff︷ ︸︸ ︷(
−∂U
∂B
∂B
∂N
− ∂U
∂cF
∂fF
∂N
)
N ′+
MD Interaction︷ ︸︸ ︷(
−∂U
∂B
∂B
∂I
− ∂U
∂cF
∂fF
∂I
)
∂I
∂eAN
]
1
∂U
∂cA
(4.29)
The optimal tax on nutrient run-off τ ∗N (4.29) is equal to its Pigouvian level τ̂N
∗ that
internalizes the marginal social damage from nutrient run-off in agricultural produc-
tion. It is the sum of marginal damages from nutrient run-off and marginal damages
from the interaction of nutrient run-off with temperature and ocean acidification. The
tax reflects marginal damages from nutrient run-off on the biodiversity value and on
production in the fishery sector.
4.3.3 Second-best optimal allocation
We assume now that the social planner cannot implement the carbon tax at the Pigou-
vian level and hence, there is no effective internalization of CO2 damages. In this case
the carbon tax is exogenous such that the second-best optimal level of emissions from
nutrient run-off is the value of eAN that satisfies (4.25), while e
A
M = ê
A
M(l
A, eAN , T, τM)
and eFM = ê
F
M(L− lA, T, O,N, I, τM) are implicitly8 defined by (4.17) and (4.20). The
intuition is that in each sector the representative firm will choose its level of carbon
emission once the government defines the carbon tax.
8We make use of the implicit function theorem here.
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Hence, the optimization program determining this second-best allocation reads:
max
{lA,êAM ,êFM ,eAN}
U
(
fA
(
lA, êAM , e
A
N , T (ê
A
M + ê
F
M + e
R
M)
)
,
fF
(
L− lA, êFM , T (êAM + êFM + eRM), O(êAM + êFM + eRM), N(EN), I(êAM + êFM + eRM , EN)
)
,
B
(
T (êAM + ê
F
M + e
R
M), O(ê
A
M + ê
F
M + e
R
M), N(EN), I(ê
A
M + ê
F
M + e
R
M , EN)
))
(4.30)
The second-best tax on nutrient run-off is optimally determined by the following first
order condition:
∂U
∂eAN
= 0 ⇔ ∂U
∂cA
[
∂fA
∂eAM
∂êAM
∂eAN
+
∂fA
∂eAN
+
∂fA
∂T
T ′
∂êAM
∂eAN
]
+
∂U
∂cF
[
∂fF
∂T
T ′
∂êAM
∂eAN
+
∂fF
∂O
O′
∂êAM
∂eAN
+
∂fF
∂N
N ′ +
∂fF
∂I
(
∂I
∂eAM
∂êAM
∂eAN
+
∂I
∂eAN
)]
+
∂U
∂B
[
∂B
∂T
T ′
∂êAM
∂eAN
+
∂B
∂O
O′
∂êAM
∂eAN
+
∂B
∂N
N ′ +
∂B
∂I
(
∂I
∂eAM
∂êAM
∂eAN
+
∂I
∂eAN
)]
= 0 (4.31)
Using (4.18) we obtain the second-best optimal tax on nutrient run-off τ̂N :
τ̂N =
[ MD Biodiversity︷ ︸︸ ︷
−∂U
∂B
(
∂B
∂T
T ′
∂êAM
∂eAN
+
∂B
∂O
O′
∂êAM
∂eAN
+
∂B
∂N
N ′ +
∂B
∂I
(
∂I
∂eAM
∂êAM
∂eAN
+
∂I
∂eAN
))
MD Other-Sector︷ ︸︸ ︷
− ∂U
∂cF
(
∂fF
∂T
T ′
∂êAM
∂eAN
+
∂fF
∂O
O′
∂êAM
∂eAN
+
∂fF
∂N
N ′ +
∂fF
∂I
(
∂I
∂eAM
∂êAM
∂eAN
+
∂I
∂eAN
))
MD Own-Sector︷ ︸︸ ︷
− ∂U
∂cA
(
∂fA
∂eAM
∂êAM
∂eAN
+
∂fA
∂T
T ′
∂êAM
∂eAN
)]
1
∂U
∂cA
(4.32)
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The second-best optimal tax on nutrient run-off is the sum of marginal damages on
biodiversity from nutrient run-off and its interaction with global warming and ocean
acidification as well as from marginal damages on fisheries (MD Other-Sector) and
agriculture (MD Own-Sector).9 In the following we compare the second-best optimal
tax on nutrient run-off to its Pigouvian level τ̂N
∗, which captures the external effects
of nutrient run-off and of its interaction with global warming and ocean acidification
as given in equation (4.29). This allows us to decompose τ̂N
∗ according to the next
equation (4.33).
τ̂N = τ̂N
∗ +
[ Additional MD Biodiversity︷ ︸︸ ︷
−∂U
∂B
(
∂B
∂T
T ′
∂êAM
∂eAN
+
∂B
∂O
O′
∂êAM
∂eAN
+
∂B
∂I
∂I
∂eAM
∂êAM
∂eAN
)
Additional MD Other-Sector︷ ︸︸ ︷
− ∂U
∂cF
(
∂fF
∂T
T ′
∂êAM
∂eAN
+
∂fF
∂O
O′
∂êAM
∂eAN
+
∂fF
∂I
∂I
∂eAM
∂êAM
∂eAN
) Additional MD Own-Sector︷ ︸︸ ︷
− ∂U
∂cA
(
∂fA
∂T
T ′
∂êAM
∂eAN
)]
1
∂U
∂cA
MAC Own-Sector︷ ︸︸ ︷
−∂f
A
∂eAM
∂êAM
∂eAN
(4.33)
We find two opposing effects that either increase or decrease τ̂N relative to its
Pigouvian level τ̂N
∗. First, as the carbon tax is set below the optimal level, both
marginal damages on biodiversity and on production in the (own) agricultural and the
(other) fishery sector from temperature increases and ocean acidification are higher
compared to when the carbon tax is Pigouvian. The second-best nutrient tax covers
these marginal damages in addition to the direct marginal damages from nutrient run-
off, which tends to increase the second-best optimal tax on nutrient run-off relative
to Pigouvian nutrient taxation. Hence, in the second-best situation also marginal
damages from temperature increase on the own agricultural sector are considered,
which is not the case when the nutrient tax is set at its Pigouvian level. Second, at
9Note that
∂êAM (l
A,eAN ,T,τM )
∂eAN
= −
∂2fA
∂eA
M
∂eA
N
∂2fA
∂eA
M
∂eA
M
> 0.
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the same time a carbon tax below its Pigouvian level makes carbon a relatively cheap
factor of production thereby decreasing marginal abatement cost of carbon used in
agricultural production. We obtain the following relation between τ̂N and τ̂N
∗:
τ̂N ≷ τ̂N ∗ iff
[ Pigouvian MD from CO2 on Biodiversity︷ ︸︸ ︷
−∂U
∂B
(
∂B
∂T
T ′ +
∂B
∂O
O′ +
∂B
∂I
∂I
∂eAM
) Pigouvian MD from CO2 on Other-Sector︷ ︸︸ ︷
− ∂U
∂cF
(
∂fF
∂T
T ′ +
∂fF
∂O
O′ +
∂fF
∂I
∂I
∂eAM
)
Pigouvian MD from CO2 on Own-Sector︷ ︸︸ ︷
− ∂U
∂cA
∂fA
∂T
T ′
]
1
∂U
∂cA
≷
Carbon Tax Own-Sector︷ ︸︸ ︷
∂fA
∂eAM
(4.18)
= τM (4.34)
The second-best optimal tax on nutrient run-off τ̂N is higher (lower) than the
Pigouvian tax on nutrient run-off τ ∗N iff the additional marginal social damage from
carbon emissions on biodiversity and on the production in both sectors are higher
(lower) than the carbon tax that must be equal to the marginal abatement cost of
carbon according to equation (4.18). We find that the sum of these additional marginal
damages is exactly equal to the social cost of the negative externalities that are covered
by the Pigouvian carbon tax (see equation (4.28)). Thus, equation (4.34) simplifies
to:
τ̂N ≷ τ̂N ∗ iff τ̂M ∗ ≷ τM (4.35)
A second-best carbon tax does not fully internalize the social cost of the negative
externalities generated by global warming and ocean acidification. As a consequence,
equation (4.35) implies that the second-best optimal nutrient tax will always be higher
than its Pigouvian level. Figure 4.2 illustrates how the second-best optimal tax on
nutrient run-off depends on the carbon tax τM that determines the marginal abatement
cost of carbon.
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τMτ̂M
∗
τ̂N
max τ̂N
τ̂N
∗
Figure 4.2: Second-best optimal tax on nutrient run-off τ̂N as a function of the carbon tax τM .
The further the carbon tax is from its Pigouvian level τ̂M
∗, the higher the second-
best tax on nutrient run-off, while the latter will reach a maximum value max τ̂N
for τM = 0. Accepting carbon emissions in agricultural production to fuel machinery
like tractors is very cheap without the additional tax expenses and thus, the second-
best tax on nutrient run-off, which is a byproduct of agricultural production, needs
to account for all additional environmental damages caused by the increased use of
carbon emissions in production. The higher τM , the lower τ̂N as using carbon emis-
sions in agricultural production becomes more expensive, which lowers the associated
environmental damages. When τM = τ̂M
∗ the social costs of negative externalities
are internalized by the Pigouivian carbon tax and the second-best tax on nutrient
run-off does not need to cover unregulated CO2 emissions and hence, will be set at its
Pigouvian level τ̂N
∗.
4.4 Discussion
This section discusses three main limitations of the theoretical analysis presented
in this paper. First, eutrophication is typically modeled as a non-point source pol-
lution problem, complicating its control using a single policy instrument. To not
over-complicate our model, we abstracted from difficulties associated with non-point
source pollution and assumed that a single tax on the use of fertilizers or pesticides
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was effective. This would be the case if it was levied per unit of toxicity-weighted
ingredient that could, for example, be implemented by introducing mineral accounts
for each farm in the country to record the application of nitrogen to crops (Pearce and
Koundouri 2003).
Second, uncertainty regarding ecosystem responses to ocean acidification in in-
teraction with other stressors is relatively high. Although a large number of studies
focusing on physiological responses of calcifying organisms have been published over
the last years, the findings are partly contradicting (Meyer and Riebesell 2015) and
uncertainties regarding the organisms’ exact sensitivity to ocean acidification remain.
For example Kroeker et al. (2013) report that some organisms show enhanced re-
sponses to projected future ocean acidification conditions. Moreover, some of the key
mechanisms, like calcification, are still not sufficiently understood (Waldbusser et al.
2016). Moreover, uncertainty extends to how such effects for particular organisms and
species scale up to the level of marine ecosystems and to what extent these can adapt.
Real world policy responses to interacting externalities of ocean acidification, global
warming and eutrophication should ideally take such uncertainties regarding marine
ecosystem responses to changing environmental conditions into account (Browman
2016).
Third, our study employs a national general equilibrium model that does not con-
sider how national carbon dioxide emissions affect marginal damages due to tempera-
ture increase and ocean acidification in the rest of the world. A sufficiently high global
carbon tax, which should be the goal of international negotiations, would take these
additional marginal damages into account. Unfortunately it has been proven extremely
difficult to find a global agreement on appropriately regulating carbon dioxide emis-
sions. The Paris Climate Agreement does not specify any consistent policies among
countries, but includes merely voluntary pledges for emissions reductions. In such
a situation national environmental policy may help those regions that are likely to
be most affected by a combination of global warming, ocean acidification and local
stressors such as eutrophication (Kelly et al. 2011).
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4.5 Conclusions
In this paper we describe a developing economy highly dependent on agriculture and
fisheries, to study the interacting external effects of ocean acidification, global warm-
ing and eutrophication on socially optimal environmental policy. The analysis is based
on a closed economy and hence, we do not consider the effect of sector emissions on
climate change and ocean acidification on the rest of the world. Instead we focus
on how national environmental policy can optimally respond to interacting environ-
mental externalities. The structure of the general equilibrium model is consistent
with recommendations formulated in recent research on socioeconomic consequences
of ocean acidification and appropriate policy responses. Ocean acidification is likely
to hit developing coastal economies the hardest as they particularly depend on fishery
resources for nutrition and income. In addition, the literature suggests to not study
ocean acidification in isolation but in combination with other global and regional envi-
ronmental stressors. In this paper we combine ocean acidification with global warming
and nutrient run-off from fertilizers used in agricultural production, which also con-
tribute to regional acidification. Moreover, we assume that consumers in our economy
do not only care about fish and agricultural product consumption, but also care about
the status of biodiversity. Our model is the first to take into consideration three
externalities in a general equilibrium setting.
We derive optimal rules for taxes on CO2 emissions and agricultural nutrient run-
off and show that they depend on both isolated and interacting damage effects. The
optimal carbon tax is the sum of marginal damages from global warming, ocean acid-
ification and their interaction with the effect of nutrient run-off on the biodiversity
value as well as on production in agriculture and fisheries. The optimal carbon tax
needs to account not only for isolated but also for synergetic damages captured by the
interaction term. Thereby eutrophication increases the optimal carbon tax through its
interaction with global warming and ocean acidification. The optimal tax on nutrient
run-off is the sum of marginal damages from nutrient run-off and its interaction with
global warming and ocean acidification on biodiversity as well as on production in the
fishery sector. Also in this case synergetic damages, captured by the interaction term,
increase the first-best nutrient tax.
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In addition, we derive a second-best rule for a tax on agricultural run-off of pesti-
cides and fertilizers for the realistic case that the carbon tax is set below its Pigouvian
level such that CO2 externalities are not fully internalized. On the one hand we find
that the second-best tax on nutrient run-off will be higher than its Pigouvian level
to account for the additional marginal damages from carbon emissions on biodiver-
sity and production in both sectors that are not covered by the carbon tax. On the
other hand a carbon tax below its Pigouvian level makes carbon intensive fuels, which
are a necessary input for production in both sector, relatively cheap. Consequently
marginal abatement costs for carbon emissions decrease, which lowers the second-best
optimal tax on nutrient run-off compared to its Pigouvian level. Overall we obtain
that the former positive effect will be higher than the latter negative effect and thus,
the second-best nutrient tax will always be higher than its Pigouvian level.
Our analysis shows the importance of regulating ocean acidification within a frame-
work of other important drivers of environmental change like global warming and eu-
trophication. Ideally marginal environmental damages from ocean acidification should
be internalized by a tax on CO2 emissions that is high enough to not only reflect
marginal damages from temperature increases, but also marginal damages from ocean
acidification and the interaction of both with regional sources of acidification like nu-
trient run-off from agriculture. Unfortunately, it is more realistic to expect that CO2
externalities will not be fully internalized, especially in the setting of a coastal devel-
oping economy with presumably unstable political institutions. Moreover, estimating
marginal economic damages from ocean acidification is a challenging task that is com-
plicated by the uncertainty regarding actual and future ecosystem responses. When –
for whatever reasons – the tax on CO2 emissions cannot be set to its Pigouvian level,
i.e. the level that internalizes CO2 externalities, this paper demonstrates that regional
environmental policy becomes relevant. A sufficiently high tax on nutrient run-off from
agricultural production can mitigate not only marginal environmental damages from
nutrient run-off but also account for unregulated carbon emissions. Putting such poli-
cies in place will be of particular importance for developing coastal economies that are
likely to suffer the most from ocean acidification.
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